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Scientific Research – Types, Purpose and Guide

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Scientific Research

Definition:

Scientific research is the systematic and empirical investigation of phenomena, theories, or hypotheses, using various methods and techniques in order to acquire new knowledge or to validate existing knowledge.

It involves the collection, analysis, interpretation, and presentation of data, as well as the formulation and testing of hypotheses. Scientific research can be conducted in various fields, such as natural sciences, social sciences, and engineering, and may involve experiments, observations, surveys, or other forms of data collection. The goal of scientific research is to advance knowledge, improve understanding, and contribute to the development of solutions to practical problems.

Types of Scientific Research

There are different types of scientific research, which can be classified based on their purpose, method, and application. In this response, we will discuss the four main types of scientific research.

Descriptive Research

Descriptive research aims to describe or document a particular phenomenon or situation, without altering it in any way. This type of research is usually done through observation, surveys, or case studies. Descriptive research is useful in generating ideas, understanding complex phenomena, and providing a foundation for future research. However, it does not provide explanations or causal relationships between variables.

Exploratory Research

Exploratory research aims to explore a new area of inquiry or develop initial ideas for future research. This type of research is usually conducted through observation, interviews, or focus groups. Exploratory research is useful in generating hypotheses, identifying research questions, and determining the feasibility of a larger study. However, it does not provide conclusive evidence or establish cause-and-effect relationships.

Experimental Research

Experimental research aims to test cause-and-effect relationships between variables by manipulating one variable and observing the effects on another variable. This type of research involves the use of an experimental group, which receives a treatment, and a control group, which does not receive the treatment. Experimental research is useful in establishing causal relationships, replicating results, and controlling extraneous variables. However, it may not be feasible or ethical to manipulate certain variables in some contexts.

Correlational Research

Correlational research aims to examine the relationship between two or more variables without manipulating them. This type of research involves the use of statistical techniques to determine the strength and direction of the relationship between variables. Correlational research is useful in identifying patterns, predicting outcomes, and testing theories. However, it does not establish causation or control for confounding variables.

Scientific Research Methods

Scientific research methods are used in scientific research to investigate phenomena, acquire knowledge, and answer questions using empirical evidence. Here are some commonly used scientific research methods:

Observational Studies

This method involves observing and recording phenomena as they occur in their natural setting. It can be done through direct observation or by using tools such as cameras, microscopes, or sensors.

Experimental Studies

This method involves manipulating one or more variables to determine the effect on the outcome. This type of study is often used to establish cause-and-effect relationships.

Survey Research

This method involves collecting data from a large number of people by asking them a set of standardized questions. Surveys can be conducted in person, over the phone, or online.

Case Studies

This method involves in-depth analysis of a single individual, group, or organization. Case studies are often used to gain insights into complex or unusual phenomena.

Meta-analysis

This method involves combining data from multiple studies to arrive at a more reliable conclusion. This technique can be used to identify patterns and trends across a large number of studies.

Qualitative Research

This method involves collecting and analyzing non-numerical data, such as interviews, focus groups, or observations. This type of research is often used to explore complex phenomena and to gain an understanding of people’s experiences and perspectives.

Quantitative Research

This method involves collecting and analyzing numerical data using statistical techniques. This type of research is often used to test hypotheses and to establish cause-and-effect relationships.

Longitudinal Studies

This method involves following a group of individuals over a period of time to observe changes and to identify patterns and trends. This type of study can be used to investigate the long-term effects of a particular intervention or exposure.

Data Analysis Methods

There are many different data analysis methods used in scientific research, and the choice of method depends on the type of data being collected and the research question. Here are some commonly used data analysis methods:

• Descriptive statistics: This involves using summary statistics such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and range to describe the basic features of the data.
• Inferential statistics: This involves using statistical tests to make inferences about a population based on a sample of data. Examples of inferential statistics include t-tests, ANOVA, and regression analysis.
• Qualitative analysis: This involves analyzing non-numerical data such as interviews, focus groups, and observations. Qualitative analysis may involve identifying themes, patterns, or categories in the data.
• Content analysis: This involves analyzing the content of written or visual materials such as articles, speeches, or images. Content analysis may involve identifying themes, patterns, or categories in the content.
• Data mining: This involves using automated methods to analyze large datasets to identify patterns, trends, or relationships in the data.
• Machine learning: This involves using algorithms to analyze data and make predictions or classifications based on the patterns identified in the data.

Application of Scientific Research

Scientific research has numerous applications in many fields, including:

• Medicine and healthcare: Scientific research is used to develop new drugs, medical treatments, and vaccines. It is also used to understand the causes and risk factors of diseases, as well as to develop new diagnostic tools and medical devices.
• Agriculture : Scientific research is used to develop new crop varieties, to improve crop yields, and to develop more sustainable farming practices.
• Technology and engineering : Scientific research is used to develop new technologies and engineering solutions, such as renewable energy systems, new materials, and advanced manufacturing techniques.
• Environmental science : Scientific research is used to understand the impacts of human activity on the environment and to develop solutions for mitigating those impacts. It is also used to monitor and manage natural resources, such as water and air quality.
• Education : Scientific research is used to develop new teaching methods and educational materials, as well as to understand how people learn and develop.
• Business and economics: Scientific research is used to understand consumer behavior, to develop new products and services, and to analyze economic trends and policies.
• Social sciences : Scientific research is used to understand human behavior, attitudes, and social dynamics. It is also used to develop interventions to improve social welfare and to inform public policy.

How to Conduct Scientific Research

Conducting scientific research involves several steps, including:

• Identify a research question: Start by identifying a question or problem that you want to investigate. This question should be clear, specific, and relevant to your field of study.
• Conduct a literature review: Before starting your research, conduct a thorough review of existing research in your field. This will help you identify gaps in knowledge and develop hypotheses or research questions.
• Develop a research plan: Once you have a research question, develop a plan for how you will collect and analyze data to answer that question. This plan should include a detailed methodology, a timeline, and a budget.
• Collect data: Depending on your research question and methodology, you may collect data through surveys, experiments, observations, or other methods.
• Analyze data: Once you have collected your data, analyze it using appropriate statistical or qualitative methods. This will help you draw conclusions about your research question.
• Interpret results: Based on your analysis, interpret your results and draw conclusions about your research question. Discuss any limitations or implications of your findings.
• Communicate results: Finally, communicate your findings to others in your field through presentations, publications, or other means.

Purpose of Scientific Research

The purpose of scientific research is to systematically investigate phenomena, acquire new knowledge, and advance our understanding of the world around us. Scientific research has several key goals, including:

• Exploring the unknown: Scientific research is often driven by curiosity and the desire to explore uncharted territory. Scientists investigate phenomena that are not well understood, in order to discover new insights and develop new theories.
• Testing hypotheses: Scientific research involves developing hypotheses or research questions, and then testing them through observation and experimentation. This allows scientists to evaluate the validity of their ideas and refine their understanding of the phenomena they are studying.
• Solving problems: Scientific research is often motivated by the desire to solve practical problems or address real-world challenges. For example, researchers may investigate the causes of a disease in order to develop new treatments, or explore ways to make renewable energy more affordable and accessible.
• Advancing knowledge: Scientific research is a collective effort to advance our understanding of the world around us. By building on existing knowledge and developing new insights, scientists contribute to a growing body of knowledge that can be used to inform decision-making, solve problems, and improve our lives.

Examples of Scientific Research

Here are some examples of scientific research that are currently ongoing or have recently been completed:

• Clinical trials for new treatments: Scientific research in the medical field often involves clinical trials to test new treatments for diseases and conditions. For example, clinical trials may be conducted to evaluate the safety and efficacy of new drugs or medical devices.
• Genomics research: Scientists are conducting research to better understand the human genome and its role in health and disease. This includes research on genetic mutations that can cause diseases such as cancer, as well as the development of personalized medicine based on an individual’s genetic makeup.
• Climate change: Scientific research is being conducted to understand the causes and impacts of climate change, as well as to develop solutions for mitigating its effects. This includes research on renewable energy technologies, carbon capture and storage, and sustainable land use practices.
• Neuroscience : Scientists are conducting research to understand the workings of the brain and the nervous system, with the goal of developing new treatments for neurological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease.
• Artificial intelligence: Researchers are working to develop new algorithms and technologies to improve the capabilities of artificial intelligence systems. This includes research on machine learning, computer vision, and natural language processing.
• Space exploration: Scientific research is being conducted to explore the cosmos and learn more about the origins of the universe. This includes research on exoplanets, black holes, and the search for extraterrestrial life.

When to use Scientific Research

Some specific situations where scientific research may be particularly useful include:

• Solving problems: Scientific research can be used to investigate practical problems or address real-world challenges. For example, scientists may investigate the causes of a disease in order to develop new treatments, or explore ways to make renewable energy more affordable and accessible.
• Decision-making: Scientific research can provide evidence-based information to inform decision-making. For example, policymakers may use scientific research to evaluate the effectiveness of different policy options or to make decisions about public health and safety.
• Innovation : Scientific research can be used to develop new technologies, products, and processes. For example, research on materials science can lead to the development of new materials with unique properties that can be used in a range of applications.
• Knowledge creation : Scientific research is an important way of generating new knowledge and advancing our understanding of the world around us. This can lead to new theories, insights, and discoveries that can benefit society.

Advantages of Scientific Research

There are many advantages of scientific research, including:

• Improved understanding : Scientific research allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the world around us, from the smallest subatomic particles to the largest celestial bodies.
• Evidence-based decision making: Scientific research provides evidence-based information that can inform decision-making in many fields, from public policy to medicine.
• Technological advancements: Scientific research drives technological advancements in fields such as medicine, engineering, and materials science. These advancements can improve quality of life, increase efficiency, and reduce costs.
• New discoveries: Scientific research can lead to new discoveries and breakthroughs that can advance our knowledge in many fields. These discoveries can lead to new theories, technologies, and products.
• Economic benefits : Scientific research can stimulate economic growth by creating new industries and jobs, and by generating new technologies and products.
• Improved health outcomes: Scientific research can lead to the development of new medical treatments and technologies that can improve health outcomes and quality of life for people around the world.
• Increased innovation: Scientific research encourages innovation by promoting collaboration, creativity, and curiosity. This can lead to new and unexpected discoveries that can benefit society.

Limitations of Scientific Research

Scientific research has some limitations that researchers should be aware of. These limitations can include:

• Research design limitations : The design of a research study can impact the reliability and validity of the results. Poorly designed studies can lead to inaccurate or inconclusive results. Researchers must carefully consider the study design to ensure that it is appropriate for the research question and the population being studied.
• Sample size limitations: The size of the sample being studied can impact the generalizability of the results. Small sample sizes may not be representative of the larger population, and may lead to incorrect conclusions.
• Time and resource limitations: Scientific research can be costly and time-consuming. Researchers may not have the resources necessary to conduct a large-scale study, or may not have sufficient time to complete a study with appropriate controls and analysis.
• Ethical limitations : Certain types of research may raise ethical concerns, such as studies involving human or animal subjects. Ethical concerns may limit the scope of the research that can be conducted, or require additional protocols and procedures to ensure the safety and well-being of participants.
• Limitations of technology: Technology may limit the types of research that can be conducted, or the accuracy of the data collected. For example, certain types of research may require advanced technology that is not yet available, or may be limited by the accuracy of current measurement tools.
• Limitations of existing knowledge: Existing knowledge may limit the types of research that can be conducted. For example, if there is limited knowledge in a particular field, it may be difficult to design a study that can provide meaningful results.

About the author

Muhammad Hassan

Researcher, Academic Writer, Web developer

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What Is Research, and Why Do People Do It?

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• First Online: 03 December 2022

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• James Hiebert 6 ,
• Jinfa Cai 7 ,
• Stephen Hwang 7 ,
• Anne K Morris 6 &
• Charles Hohensee 6  

Part of the book series: Research in Mathematics Education ((RME))

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Abstractspiepr Abs1

Every day people do research as they gather information to learn about something of interest. In the scientific world, however, research means something different than simply gathering information. Scientific research is characterized by its careful planning and observing, by its relentless efforts to understand and explain, and by its commitment to learn from everyone else seriously engaged in research. We call this kind of research scientific inquiry and define it as “formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses.” By “hypotheses” we do not mean the hypotheses you encounter in statistics courses. We mean predictions about what you expect to find and rationales for why you made these predictions. Throughout this and the remaining chapters we make clear that the process of scientific inquiry applies to all kinds of research studies and data, both qualitative and quantitative.

You have full access to this open access chapter,  Download chapter PDF

Part I. What Is Research?

Have you ever studied something carefully because you wanted to know more about it? Maybe you wanted to know more about your grandmother’s life when she was younger so you asked her to tell you stories from her childhood, or maybe you wanted to know more about a fertilizer you were about to use in your garden so you read the ingredients on the package and looked them up online. According to the dictionary definition, you were doing research.

Recall your high school assignments asking you to “research” a topic. The assignment likely included consulting a variety of sources that discussed the topic, perhaps including some “original” sources. Often, the teacher referred to your product as a “research paper.”

Were you conducting research when you interviewed your grandmother or wrote high school papers reviewing a particular topic? Our view is that you were engaged in part of the research process, but only a small part. In this book, we reserve the word “research” for what it means in the scientific world, that is, for scientific research or, more pointedly, for scientific inquiry .

Exercise 1.1

Before you read any further, write a definition of what you think scientific inquiry is. Keep it short—Two to three sentences. You will periodically update this definition as you read this chapter and the remainder of the book.

This book is about scientific inquiry—what it is and how to do it. For starters, scientific inquiry is a process, a particular way of finding out about something that involves a number of phases. Each phase of the process constitutes one aspect of scientific inquiry. You are doing scientific inquiry as you engage in each phase, but you have not done scientific inquiry until you complete the full process. Each phase is necessary but not sufficient.

In this chapter, we set the stage by defining scientific inquiry—describing what it is and what it is not—and by discussing what it is good for and why people do it. The remaining chapters build directly on the ideas presented in this chapter.

A first thing to know is that scientific inquiry is not all or nothing. “Scientificness” is a continuum. Inquiries can be more scientific or less scientific. What makes an inquiry more scientific? You might be surprised there is no universally agreed upon answer to this question. None of the descriptors we know of are sufficient by themselves to define scientific inquiry. But all of them give you a way of thinking about some aspects of the process of scientific inquiry. Each one gives you different insights.

Exercise 1.2

As you read about each descriptor below, think about what would make an inquiry more or less scientific. If you think a descriptor is important, use it to revise your definition of scientific inquiry.

Creating an Image of Scientific Inquiry

We will present three descriptors of scientific inquiry. Each provides a different perspective and emphasizes a different aspect of scientific inquiry. We will draw on all three descriptors to compose our definition of scientific inquiry.

Descriptor 1. Experience Carefully Planned in Advance

Sir Ronald Fisher, often called the father of modern statistical design, once referred to research as “experience carefully planned in advance” (1935, p. 8). He said that humans are always learning from experience, from interacting with the world around them. Usually, this learning is haphazard rather than the result of a deliberate process carried out over an extended period of time. Research, Fisher said, was learning from experience, but experience carefully planned in advance.

This phrase can be fully appreciated by looking at each word. The fact that scientific inquiry is based on experience means that it is based on interacting with the world. These interactions could be thought of as the stuff of scientific inquiry. In addition, it is not just any experience that counts. The experience must be carefully planned . The interactions with the world must be conducted with an explicit, describable purpose, and steps must be taken to make the intended learning as likely as possible. This planning is an integral part of scientific inquiry; it is not just a preparation phase. It is one of the things that distinguishes scientific inquiry from many everyday learning experiences. Finally, these steps must be taken beforehand and the purpose of the inquiry must be articulated in advance of the experience. Clearly, scientific inquiry does not happen by accident, by just stumbling into something. Stumbling into something unexpected and interesting can happen while engaged in scientific inquiry, but learning does not depend on it and serendipity does not make the inquiry scientific.

Descriptor 2. Observing Something and Trying to Explain Why It Is the Way It Is

When we were writing this chapter and googled “scientific inquiry,” the first entry was: “Scientific inquiry refers to the diverse ways in which scientists study the natural world and propose explanations based on the evidence derived from their work.” The emphasis is on studying, or observing, and then explaining . This descriptor takes the image of scientific inquiry beyond carefully planned experience and includes explaining what was experienced.

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “explain” means “(a) to make known, (b) to make plain or understandable, (c) to give the reason or cause of, and (d) to show the logical development or relations of” (Merriam-Webster, n.d. ). We will use all these definitions. Taken together, they suggest that to explain an observation means to understand it by finding reasons (or causes) for why it is as it is. In this sense of scientific inquiry, the following are synonyms: explaining why, understanding why, and reasoning about causes and effects. Our image of scientific inquiry now includes planning, observing, and explaining why.

We need to add a final note about this descriptor. We have phrased it in a way that suggests “observing something” means you are observing something in real time—observing the way things are or the way things are changing. This is often true. But, observing could mean observing data that already have been collected, maybe by someone else making the original observations (e.g., secondary analysis of NAEP data or analysis of existing video recordings of classroom instruction). We will address secondary analyses more fully in Chap. 4 . For now, what is important is that the process requires explaining why the data look like they do.

We must note that for us, the term “data” is not limited to numerical or quantitative data such as test scores. Data can also take many nonquantitative forms, including written survey responses, interview transcripts, journal entries, video recordings of students, teachers, and classrooms, text messages, and so forth.

Exercise 1.3

What are the implications of the statement that just “observing” is not enough to count as scientific inquiry? Does this mean that a detailed description of a phenomenon is not scientific inquiry?

Find sources that define research in education that differ with our position, that say description alone, without explanation, counts as scientific research. Identify the precise points where the opinions differ. What are the best arguments for each of the positions? Which do you prefer? Why?

Descriptor 3. Updating Everyone’s Thinking in Response to More and Better Information

This descriptor focuses on a third aspect of scientific inquiry: updating and advancing the field’s understanding of phenomena that are investigated. This descriptor foregrounds a powerful characteristic of scientific inquiry: the reliability (or trustworthiness) of what is learned and the ultimate inevitability of this learning to advance human understanding of phenomena. Humans might choose not to learn from scientific inquiry, but history suggests that scientific inquiry always has the potential to advance understanding and that, eventually, humans take advantage of these new understandings.

Before exploring these bold claims a bit further, note that this descriptor uses “information” in the same way the previous two descriptors used “experience” and “observations.” These are the stuff of scientific inquiry and we will use them often, sometimes interchangeably. Frequently, we will use the term “data” to stand for all these terms.

An overriding goal of scientific inquiry is for everyone to learn from what one scientist does. Much of this book is about the methods you need to use so others have faith in what you report and can learn the same things you learned. This aspect of scientific inquiry has many implications.

One implication is that scientific inquiry is not a private practice. It is a public practice available for others to see and learn from. Notice how different this is from everyday learning. When you happen to learn something from your everyday experience, often only you gain from the experience. The fact that research is a public practice means it is also a social one. It is best conducted by interacting with others along the way: soliciting feedback at each phase, taking opportunities to present work-in-progress, and benefitting from the advice of others.

A second implication is that you, as the researcher, must be committed to sharing what you are doing and what you are learning in an open and transparent way. This allows all phases of your work to be scrutinized and critiqued. This is what gives your work credibility. The reliability or trustworthiness of your findings depends on your colleagues recognizing that you have used all appropriate methods to maximize the chances that your claims are justified by the data.

A third implication of viewing scientific inquiry as a collective enterprise is the reverse of the second—you must be committed to receiving comments from others. You must treat your colleagues as fair and honest critics even though it might sometimes feel otherwise. You must appreciate their job, which is to remain skeptical while scrutinizing what you have done in considerable detail. To provide the best help to you, they must remain skeptical about your conclusions (when, for example, the data are difficult for them to interpret) until you offer a convincing logical argument based on the information you share. A rather harsh but good-to-remember statement of the role of your friendly critics was voiced by Karl Popper, a well-known twentieth century philosopher of science: “. . . if you are interested in the problem which I tried to solve by my tentative assertion, you may help me by criticizing it as severely as you can” (Popper, 1968, p. 27).

A final implication of this third descriptor is that, as someone engaged in scientific inquiry, you have no choice but to update your thinking when the data support a different conclusion. This applies to your own data as well as to those of others. When data clearly point to a specific claim, even one that is quite different than you expected, you must reconsider your position. If the outcome is replicated multiple times, you need to adjust your thinking accordingly. Scientific inquiry does not let you pick and choose which data to believe; it mandates that everyone update their thinking when the data warrant an update.

Doing Scientific Inquiry

We define scientific inquiry in an operational sense—what does it mean to do scientific inquiry? What kind of process would satisfy all three descriptors: carefully planning an experience in advance; observing and trying to explain what you see; and, contributing to updating everyone’s thinking about an important phenomenon?

We define scientific inquiry as formulating , testing , and revising hypotheses about phenomena of interest.

Of course, we are not the only ones who define it in this way. The definition for the scientific method posted by the editors of Britannica is: “a researcher develops a hypothesis, tests it through various means, and then modifies the hypothesis on the basis of the outcome of the tests and experiments” (Britannica, n.d. ).

Notice how defining scientific inquiry this way satisfies each of the descriptors. “Carefully planning an experience in advance” is exactly what happens when formulating a hypothesis about a phenomenon of interest and thinking about how to test it. “ Observing a phenomenon” occurs when testing a hypothesis, and “ explaining ” what is found is required when revising a hypothesis based on the data. Finally, “updating everyone’s thinking” comes from comparing publicly the original with the revised hypothesis.

Doing scientific inquiry, as we have defined it, underscores the value of accumulating knowledge rather than generating random bits of knowledge. Formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses is an ongoing process, with each revised hypothesis begging for another test, whether by the same researcher or by new researchers. The editors of Britannica signaled this cyclic process by adding the following phrase to their definition of the scientific method: “The modified hypothesis is then retested, further modified, and tested again.” Scientific inquiry creates a process that encourages each study to build on the studies that have gone before. Through collective engagement in this process of building study on top of study, the scientific community works together to update its thinking.

Before exploring more fully the meaning of “formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses,” we need to acknowledge that this is not the only way researchers define research. Some researchers prefer a less formal definition, one that includes more serendipity, less planning, less explanation. You might have come across more open definitions such as “research is finding out about something.” We prefer the tighter hypothesis formulation, testing, and revision definition because we believe it provides a single, coherent map for conducting research that addresses many of the thorny problems educational researchers encounter. We believe it is the most useful orientation toward research and the most helpful to learn as a beginning researcher.

A final clarification of our definition is that it applies equally to qualitative and quantitative research. This is a familiar distinction in education that has generated much discussion. You might think our definition favors quantitative methods over qualitative methods because the language of hypothesis formulation and testing is often associated with quantitative methods. In fact, we do not favor one method over another. In Chap. 4 , we will illustrate how our definition fits research using a range of quantitative and qualitative methods.

Exercise 1.4

Look for ways to extend what the field knows in an area that has already received attention by other researchers. Specifically, you can search for a program of research carried out by more experienced researchers that has some revised hypotheses that remain untested. Identify a revised hypothesis that you might like to test.

Unpacking the Terms Formulating, Testing, and Revising Hypotheses

To get a full sense of the definition of scientific inquiry we will use throughout this book, it is helpful to spend a little time with each of the key terms.

We first want to make clear that we use the term “hypothesis” as it is defined in most dictionaries and as it used in many scientific fields rather than as it is usually defined in educational statistics courses. By “hypothesis,” we do not mean a null hypothesis that is accepted or rejected by statistical analysis. Rather, we use “hypothesis” in the sense conveyed by the following definitions: “An idea or explanation for something that is based on known facts but has not yet been proved” (Cambridge University Press, n.d. ), and “An unproved theory, proposition, or supposition, tentatively accepted to explain certain facts and to provide a basis for further investigation or argument” (Agnes & Guralnik, 2008 ).

We distinguish two parts to “hypotheses.” Hypotheses consist of predictions and rationales . Predictions are statements about what you expect to find when you inquire about something. Rationales are explanations for why you made the predictions you did, why you believe your predictions are correct. So, for us “formulating hypotheses” means making explicit predictions and developing rationales for the predictions.

“Testing hypotheses” means making observations that allow you to assess in what ways your predictions were correct and in what ways they were incorrect. In education research, it is rarely useful to think of your predictions as either right or wrong. Because of the complexity of most issues you will investigate, most predictions will be right in some ways and wrong in others.

By studying the observations you make (data you collect) to test your hypotheses, you can revise your hypotheses to better align with the observations. This means revising your predictions plus revising your rationales to justify your adjusted predictions. Even though you might not run another test, formulating revised hypotheses is an essential part of conducting a research study. Comparing your original and revised hypotheses informs everyone of what you learned by conducting your study. In addition, a revised hypothesis sets the stage for you or someone else to extend your study and accumulate more knowledge of the phenomenon.

We should note that not everyone makes a clear distinction between predictions and rationales as two aspects of hypotheses. In fact, common, non-scientific uses of the word “hypothesis” may limit it to only a prediction or only an explanation (or rationale). We choose to explicitly include both prediction and rationale in our definition of hypothesis, not because we assert this should be the universal definition, but because we want to foreground the importance of both parts acting in concert. Using “hypothesis” to represent both prediction and rationale could hide the two aspects, but we make them explicit because they provide different kinds of information. It is usually easier to make predictions than develop rationales because predictions can be guesses, hunches, or gut feelings about which you have little confidence. Developing a compelling rationale requires careful thought plus reading what other researchers have found plus talking with your colleagues. Often, while you are developing your rationale you will find good reasons to change your predictions. Developing good rationales is the engine that drives scientific inquiry. Rationales are essentially descriptions of how much you know about the phenomenon you are studying. Throughout this guide, we will elaborate on how developing good rationales drives scientific inquiry. For now, we simply note that it can sharpen your predictions and help you to interpret your data as you test your hypotheses.

Hypotheses in education research take a variety of forms or types. This is because there are a variety of phenomena that can be investigated. Investigating educational phenomena is sometimes best done using qualitative methods, sometimes using quantitative methods, and most often using mixed methods (e.g., Hay, 2016 ; Weis et al. 2019a ; Weisner, 2005 ). This means that, given our definition, hypotheses are equally applicable to qualitative and quantitative investigations.

Hypotheses take different forms when they are used to investigate different kinds of phenomena. Two very different activities in education could be labeled conducting experiments and descriptions. In an experiment, a hypothesis makes a prediction about anticipated changes, say the changes that occur when a treatment or intervention is applied. You might investigate how students’ thinking changes during a particular kind of instruction.

A second type of hypothesis, relevant for descriptive research, makes a prediction about what you will find when you investigate and describe the nature of a situation. The goal is to understand a situation as it exists rather than to understand a change from one situation to another. In this case, your prediction is what you expect to observe. Your rationale is the set of reasons for making this prediction; it is your current explanation for why the situation will look like it does.

You will probably read, if you have not already, that some researchers say you do not need a prediction to conduct a descriptive study. We will discuss this point of view in Chap. 2 . For now, we simply claim that scientific inquiry, as we have defined it, applies to all kinds of research studies. Descriptive studies, like others, not only benefit from formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses, but also need hypothesis formulating, testing, and revising.

One reason we define research as formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses is that if you think of research in this way you are less likely to go wrong. It is a useful guide for the entire process, as we will describe in detail in the chapters ahead. For example, as you build the rationale for your predictions, you are constructing the theoretical framework for your study (Chap. 3 ). As you work out the methods you will use to test your hypothesis, every decision you make will be based on asking, “Will this help me formulate or test or revise my hypothesis?” (Chap. 4 ). As you interpret the results of testing your predictions, you will compare them to what you predicted and examine the differences, focusing on how you must revise your hypotheses (Chap. 5 ). By anchoring the process to formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses, you will make smart decisions that yield a coherent and well-designed study.

Exercise 1.5

Compare the concept of formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses with the descriptions of scientific inquiry contained in Scientific Research in Education (NRC, 2002 ). How are they similar or different?

Exercise 1.6

Provide an example to illustrate and emphasize the differences between everyday learning/thinking and scientific inquiry.

Learning from Doing Scientific Inquiry

We noted earlier that a measure of what you have learned by conducting a research study is found in the differences between your original hypothesis and your revised hypothesis based on the data you collected to test your hypothesis. We will elaborate this statement in later chapters, but we preview our argument here.

Even before collecting data, scientific inquiry requires cycles of making a prediction, developing a rationale, refining your predictions, reading and studying more to strengthen your rationale, refining your predictions again, and so forth. And, even if you have run through several such cycles, you still will likely find that when you test your prediction you will be partly right and partly wrong. The results will support some parts of your predictions but not others, or the results will “kind of” support your predictions. A critical part of scientific inquiry is making sense of your results by interpreting them against your predictions. Carefully describing what aspects of your data supported your predictions, what aspects did not, and what data fell outside of any predictions is not an easy task, but you cannot learn from your study without doing this analysis.

Analyzing the matches and mismatches between your predictions and your data allows you to formulate different rationales that would have accounted for more of the data. The best revised rationale is the one that accounts for the most data. Once you have revised your rationales, you can think about the predictions they best justify or explain. It is by comparing your original rationales to your new rationales that you can sort out what you learned from your study.

Suppose your study was an experiment. Maybe you were investigating the effects of a new instructional intervention on students’ learning. Your original rationale was your explanation for why the intervention would change the learning outcomes in a particular way. Your revised rationale explained why the changes that you observed occurred like they did and why your revised predictions are better. Maybe your original rationale focused on the potential of the activities if they were implemented in ideal ways and your revised rationale included the factors that are likely to affect how teachers implement them. By comparing the before and after rationales, you are describing what you learned—what you can explain now that you could not before. Another way of saying this is that you are describing how much more you understand now than before you conducted your study.

Revised predictions based on carefully planned and collected data usually exhibit some of the following features compared with the originals: more precision, more completeness, and broader scope. Revised rationales have more explanatory power and become more complete, more aligned with the new predictions, sharper, and overall more convincing.

Part II. Why Do Educators Do Research?

Doing scientific inquiry is a lot of work. Each phase of the process takes time, and you will often cycle back to improve earlier phases as you engage in later phases. Because of the significant effort required, you should make sure your study is worth it. So, from the beginning, you should think about the purpose of your study. Why do you want to do it? And, because research is a social practice, you should also think about whether the results of your study are likely to be important and significant to the education community.

If you are doing research in the way we have described—as scientific inquiry—then one purpose of your study is to understand , not just to describe or evaluate or report. As we noted earlier, when you formulate hypotheses, you are developing rationales that explain why things might be like they are. In our view, trying to understand and explain is what separates research from other kinds of activities, like evaluating or describing.

One reason understanding is so important is that it allows researchers to see how or why something works like it does. When you see how something works, you are better able to predict how it might work in other contexts, under other conditions. And, because conditions, or contextual factors, matter a lot in education, gaining insights into applying your findings to other contexts increases the contributions of your work and its importance to the broader education community.

Consequently, the purposes of research studies in education often include the more specific aim of identifying and understanding the conditions under which the phenomena being studied work like the observations suggest. A classic example of this kind of study in mathematics education was reported by William Brownell and Harold Moser in 1949 . They were trying to establish which method of subtracting whole numbers could be taught most effectively—the regrouping method or the equal additions method. However, they realized that effectiveness might depend on the conditions under which the methods were taught—“meaningfully” versus “mechanically.” So, they designed a study that crossed the two instructional approaches with the two different methods (regrouping and equal additions). Among other results, they found that these conditions did matter. The regrouping method was more effective under the meaningful condition than the mechanical condition, but the same was not true for the equal additions algorithm.

What do education researchers want to understand? In our view, the ultimate goal of education is to offer all students the best possible learning opportunities. So, we believe the ultimate purpose of scientific inquiry in education is to develop understanding that supports the improvement of learning opportunities for all students. We say “ultimate” because there are lots of issues that must be understood to improve learning opportunities for all students. Hypotheses about many aspects of education are connected, ultimately, to students’ learning. For example, formulating and testing a hypothesis that preservice teachers need to engage in particular kinds of activities in their coursework in order to teach particular topics well is, ultimately, connected to improving students’ learning opportunities. So is hypothesizing that school districts often devote relatively few resources to instructional leadership training or hypothesizing that positioning mathematics as a tool students can use to combat social injustice can help students see the relevance of mathematics to their lives.

We do not exclude the importance of research on educational issues more removed from improving students’ learning opportunities, but we do think the argument for their importance will be more difficult to make. If there is no way to imagine a connection between your hypothesis and improving learning opportunities for students, even a distant connection, we recommend you reconsider whether it is an important hypothesis within the education community.

Notice that we said the ultimate goal of education is to offer all students the best possible learning opportunities. For too long, educators have been satisfied with a goal of offering rich learning opportunities for lots of students, sometimes even for just the majority of students, but not necessarily for all students. Evaluations of success often are based on outcomes that show high averages. In other words, if many students have learned something, or even a smaller number have learned a lot, educators may have been satisfied. The problem is that there is usually a pattern in the groups of students who receive lower quality opportunities—students of color and students who live in poor areas, urban and rural. This is not acceptable. Consequently, we emphasize the premise that the purpose of education research is to offer rich learning opportunities to all students.

One way to make sure you will be able to convince others of the importance of your study is to consider investigating some aspect of teachers’ shared instructional problems. Historically, researchers in education have set their own research agendas, regardless of the problems teachers are facing in schools. It is increasingly recognized that teachers have had trouble applying to their own classrooms what researchers find. To address this problem, a researcher could partner with a teacher—better yet, a small group of teachers—and talk with them about instructional problems they all share. These discussions can create a rich pool of problems researchers can consider. If researchers pursued one of these problems (preferably alongside teachers), the connection to improving learning opportunities for all students could be direct and immediate. “Grounding a research question in instructional problems that are experienced across multiple teachers’ classrooms helps to ensure that the answer to the question will be of sufficient scope to be relevant and significant beyond the local context” (Cai et al., 2019b , p. 115).

As a beginning researcher, determining the relevance and importance of a research problem is especially challenging. We recommend talking with advisors, other experienced researchers, and peers to test the educational importance of possible research problems and topics of study. You will also learn much more about the issue of research importance when you read Chap. 5 .

Exercise 1.7

Identify a problem in education that is closely connected to improving learning opportunities and a problem that has a less close connection. For each problem, write a brief argument (like a logical sequence of if-then statements) that connects the problem to all students’ learning opportunities.

Part III. Conducting Research as a Practice of Failing Productively

Scientific inquiry involves formulating hypotheses about phenomena that are not fully understood—by you or anyone else. Even if you are able to inform your hypotheses with lots of knowledge that has already been accumulated, you are likely to find that your prediction is not entirely accurate. This is normal. Remember, scientific inquiry is a process of constantly updating your thinking. More and better information means revising your thinking, again, and again, and again. Because you never fully understand a complicated phenomenon and your hypotheses never produce completely accurate predictions, it is easy to believe you are somehow failing.

The trick is to fail upward, to fail to predict accurately in ways that inform your next hypothesis so you can make a better prediction. Some of the best-known researchers in education have been open and honest about the many times their predictions were wrong and, based on the results of their studies and those of others, they continuously updated their thinking and changed their hypotheses.

A striking example of publicly revising (actually reversing) hypotheses due to incorrect predictions is found in the work of Lee J. Cronbach, one of the most distinguished educational psychologists of the twentieth century. In 1955, Cronbach delivered his presidential address to the American Psychological Association. Titling it “Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology,” Cronbach proposed a rapprochement between two research approaches—correlational studies that focused on individual differences and experimental studies that focused on instructional treatments controlling for individual differences. (We will examine different research approaches in Chap. 4 ). If these approaches could be brought together, reasoned Cronbach ( 1957 ), researchers could find interactions between individual characteristics and treatments (aptitude-treatment interactions or ATIs), fitting the best treatments to different individuals.

In 1975, after years of research by many researchers looking for ATIs, Cronbach acknowledged the evidence for simple, useful ATIs had not been found. Even when trying to find interactions between a few variables that could provide instructional guidance, the analysis, said Cronbach, creates “a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity, tormenting even the boldest investigators and defeating even ambitious designs” (Cronbach, 1975 , p. 119).

As he was reflecting back on his work, Cronbach ( 1986 ) recommended moving away from documenting instructional effects through statistical inference (an approach he had championed for much of his career) and toward approaches that probe the reasons for these effects, approaches that provide a “full account of events in a time, place, and context” (Cronbach, 1986 , p. 104). This is a remarkable change in hypotheses, a change based on data and made fully transparent. Cronbach understood the value of failing productively.

Closer to home, in a less dramatic example, one of us began a line of scientific inquiry into how to prepare elementary preservice teachers to teach early algebra. Teaching early algebra meant engaging elementary students in early forms of algebraic reasoning. Such reasoning should help them transition from arithmetic to algebra. To begin this line of inquiry, a set of activities for preservice teachers were developed. Even though the activities were based on well-supported hypotheses, they largely failed to engage preservice teachers as predicted because of unanticipated challenges the preservice teachers faced. To capitalize on this failure, follow-up studies were conducted, first to better understand elementary preservice teachers’ challenges with preparing to teach early algebra, and then to better support preservice teachers in navigating these challenges. In this example, the initial failure was a necessary step in the researchers’ scientific inquiry and furthered the researchers’ understanding of this issue.

We present another example of failing productively in Chap. 2 . That example emerges from recounting the history of a well-known research program in mathematics education.

Making mistakes is an inherent part of doing scientific research. Conducting a study is rarely a smooth path from beginning to end. We recommend that you keep the following things in mind as you begin a career of conducting research in education.

First, do not get discouraged when you make mistakes; do not fall into the trap of feeling like you are not capable of doing research because you make too many errors.

Second, learn from your mistakes. Do not ignore your mistakes or treat them as errors that you simply need to forget and move past. Mistakes are rich sites for learning—in research just as in other fields of study.

Third, by reflecting on your mistakes, you can learn to make better mistakes, mistakes that inform you about a productive next step. You will not be able to eliminate your mistakes, but you can set a goal of making better and better mistakes.

Exercise 1.8

How does scientific inquiry differ from everyday learning in giving you the tools to fail upward? You may find helpful perspectives on this question in other resources on science and scientific inquiry (e.g., Failure: Why Science is So Successful by Firestein, 2015).

Exercise 1.9

Use what you have learned in this chapter to write a new definition of scientific inquiry. Compare this definition with the one you wrote before reading this chapter. If you are reading this book as part of a course, compare your definition with your colleagues’ definitions. Develop a consensus definition with everyone in the course.

Part IV. Preview of Chap. 2

Now that you have a good idea of what research is, at least of what we believe research is, the next step is to think about how to actually begin doing research. This means how to begin formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses. As for all phases of scientific inquiry, there are lots of things to think about. Because it is critical to start well, we devote Chap. 2 to getting started with formulating hypotheses.

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Hiebert, J., Cai, J., Hwang, S., Morris, A.K., Hohensee, C. (2023). What Is Research, and Why Do People Do It?. In: Doing Research: A New Researcher’s Guide. Research in Mathematics Education. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19078-0_1

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What is Scientific Research?

Research study design, natural vs. social science, qualitative vs. quantitative research, more information on qualitative research in the social sciences, acknowledgements.

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Some people use the term research loosely, for example:

• People will say they are researching different online websites to find the best place to buy a new appliance or locate a lawn care service.
• TV news may talk about conducting research when they conduct a viewer poll on current event topic such as an upcoming election.
• Undergraduate students working on a term paper or project may say they are researching the internet to find information.
• Private sector companies may say they are conducting research to find a solution for a supply chain holdup.

However, none of the above is considered “scientific research” unless:

• The research contributes to a body of science by providing new information through ethical study design or
• The research follows the scientific method, an iterative process of observation and inquiry.

The Scientific Method

• Make an observation: notice a phenomenon in your life or in society or find a gap in the already published literature.
• Ask a question about what you have observed.
• Hypothesize about a potential answer or explanation.
• Make predictions if our hypothesis is correct.
• Design an experiment or study that will test your prediction.
• Test the prediction by conducting an experiment or study; report the outcomes of your study.
• Iterate! Was your prediction correct? Was the outcome unexpected? Did it lead to new observations?

The scientific method is not separate from the Research Process as described in the rest of this guide, in fact the Research Process is directly related to the observation stage of the scientific method. Understanding what other scientists and researchers have already studied will help you focus your area of study and build on their knowledge.

Designing your experiment or study is important for both natural and social scientists. Sage Research Methods (SRM) has an excellent "Project Planner" that guides you through the basic stages of research design. SRM also has excellent explanations of qualitative and quantitative research methods for the social sciences.

For the natural sciences, Springer Nature Experiments and Protocol Exchange have guidance on quantitative research methods.

Books, journals, reference books, videos, podcasts, data-sets, and case studies on social science research methods.

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Open repository for sharing scientific research protocols. These protocols are posted directly on the Protocol Exchange by authors and are made freely available to the scientific community for use and comment.

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Qualitative research is primarily exploratory. It is used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations. Qualitative research is also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions and to dive deeper into a problem by studying an individual or a group.

Qualitative methods usually use unstructured or semi-structured techniques. The sample size is typically smaller than in quantitative research.

Example: interviews and focus groups.

Quantitative research is characterized by the gathering of data with the aim of testing a hypothesis. The data generated are numerical, or, if not numerical, can be transformed into useable statistics.

Quantitative data collection methods are more structured than qualitative data collection methods and sample sizes are usually larger.

Example: survey

Note: The above descriptions of qualitative and quantitative research are mainly for research in the Social Sciences, rather than for Natural Sciences as most natural sciences rely on quantitative methods for their experiments.

Qualitative research is approaching the world in its natural setting and in a way that reveals the particularities rather than doing studies in a controlled setting. It aims to understand, describe, and sometimes explain social phenomena in a number of different ways:

• Experiences of individuals or groups
• Interactions and communications
• Documents (texts, images, film, or sounds, and digital documents)
• Experiences or interactions

Qualitative researchers seek to understand how people conceptualize the world around them, what they are doing, how they are doing it or what is happening to them in terms that are significant and that offer meaningful learnings.

Qualitative researchers develop and refine concepts (or hypotheses, if they are used) in the process of research and of collecting data. Cases (its history and complexity) are an important context for understanding the issue that is studied. A major part of qualitative research is based on text and writing – from field notes and transcripts to descriptions and interpretations and finally to the presentation of the findings and of the research as a whole.

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scientific method , mathematical and experimental technique employed in the sciences . More specifically, it is the technique used in the construction and testing of a scientific hypothesis .

The process of observing, asking questions, and seeking answers through tests and experiments is not unique to any one field of science. In fact, the scientific method is applied broadly in science, across many different fields. Many empirical sciences, especially the social sciences , use mathematical tools borrowed from probability theory and statistics , together with outgrowths of these, such as decision theory , game theory , utility theory, and operations research . Philosophers of science have addressed general methodological problems, such as the nature of scientific explanation and the justification of induction .

The scientific method is critical to the development of scientific theories , which explain empirical (experiential) laws in a scientifically rational manner. In a typical application of the scientific method, a researcher develops a hypothesis , tests it through various means, and then modifies the hypothesis on the basis of the outcome of the tests and experiments. The modified hypothesis is then retested, further modified, and tested again, until it becomes consistent with observed phenomena and testing outcomes. In this way, hypotheses serve as tools by which scientists gather data. From that data and the many different scientific investigations undertaken to explore hypotheses, scientists are able to develop broad general explanations, or scientific theories.

See also Mill’s methods ; hypothetico-deductive method .

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1 Science and scientific research

What is research? Depending on who you ask, you will likely get very different answers to this seemingly innocuous question. Some people will say that they routinely research different online websites to find the best place to buy the goods or services they want. Television news channels supposedly conduct research in the form of viewer polls on topics of public interest such as forthcoming elections or government-funded projects. Undergraduate students research on the Internet to find the information they need to complete assigned projects or term papers. Postgraduate students working on research projects for a professor may see research as collecting or analysing data related to their project. Businesses and consultants research different potential solutions to remedy organisational problems such as a supply chain bottleneck or to identify customer purchase patterns. However, none of the above can be considered ‘scientific research’ unless: it contributes to a body of science, and it follows the scientific method. This chapter will examine what these terms mean.

What is science? To some, science refers to difficult high school or university-level courses such as physics, chemistry, and biology meant only for the brightest students. To others, science is a craft practiced by scientists in white coats using specialised equipment in their laboratories. Etymologically, the word ‘science’ is derived from the Latin word scientia meaning knowledge. Science refers to a systematic and organised body of knowledge in any area of inquiry that is acquired using ‘the scientific method’ (the scientific method is described further below). Science can be grouped into two broad categories: natural science and social science. Natural science is the science of naturally occurring objects or phenomena, such as light, objects, matter, earth, celestial bodies, or the human body. Natural sciences can be further classified into physical sciences, earth sciences, life sciences, and others. Physical sciences consist of disciplines such as physics (the science of physical objects), chemistry (the science of matter), and astronomy (the science of celestial objects). Earth sciences consist of disciplines such as geology (the science of the earth). Life sciences include disciplines such as biology (the science of human bodies) and botany (the science of plants). In contrast, social science is the science of people or collections of people, such as groups, firms, societies, or economies, and their individual or collective behaviours. Social sciences can be classified into disciplines such as psychology (the science of human behaviours), sociology (the science of social groups), and economics (the science of firms, markets, and economies).

The natural sciences are different from the social sciences in several respects. The natural sciences are very precise, accurate, deterministic, and independent of the person making the scientific observations. For instance, a scientific experiment in physics, such as measuring the speed of sound through a certain media or the refractive index of water, should always yield the exact same results, irrespective of the time or place of the experiment, or the person conducting the experiment. If two students conducting the same physics experiment obtain two different values of these physical properties, then it generally means that one or both of those students must be in error. However, the same cannot be said for the social sciences, which tend to be less accurate, deterministic, or unambiguous. For instance, if you measure a person’s happiness using a hypothetical instrument, you may find that the same person is more happy or less happy (or sad) on different days and sometimes, at different times on the same day. One’s happiness may vary depending on the news that person received that day or on the events that transpired earlier during that day. Furthermore, there is not a single instrument or metric that can accurately measure a person’s happiness. Hence, one instrument may calibrate a person as being ‘more happy’ while a second instrument may find that the same person is ‘less happy’ at the same instant in time. In other words, there is a high degree of measurement error in the social sciences and there is considerable uncertainty and little agreement on social science policy decisions. For instance, you will not find many disagreements among natural scientists on the speed of light or the speed of the earth around the sun, but you will find numerous disagreements among social scientists on how to solve a social problem such as reduce global terrorism or rescue an economy from a recession. Any student studying the social sciences must be cognisant of and comfortable with handling higher levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, and error that come with such sciences, which merely reflects the high variability of social objects.

Sciences can also be classified based on their purpose. Basic sciences , also called pure sciences, are those that explain the most basic objects and forces, relationships between them, and laws governing them. Examples include physics, mathematics, and biology. Applied sciences , also called practical sciences, are sciences that apply scientific knowledge from basic sciences in a physical environment. For instance, engineering is an applied science that applies the laws of physics and chemistry for practical applications such as building stronger bridges or fuel efficient combustion engines, while medicine is an applied science that applies the laws of biology to solving human ailments. Both basic and applied sciences are required for human development. However, applied science cannot stand on its own right, but instead relies on basic sciences for its progress. Of course, industry and private enterprises tend to focus more on applied sciences given their practical value, while universities study both basic and applied sciences.

Scientific knowledge

The purpose of science is to create scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge refers to a generalised body of laws and theories for explaining a phenomenon or behaviour of interest that is acquired using the scientific method. Laws are observed patterns of phenomena or behaviours, while theories are systematic explanations of the underlying phenomenon or behaviour. For instance, in physics, the Newtonian Laws of Motion describe what happens when an object is in a state of rest or motion (Newton’s First Law), what force is needed to move a stationary object or stop a moving object (Newton’s Second Law), and what happens when two objects collide (Newton’s Third Law). Collectively, the three laws constitute the basis of classical mechanics—a theory of moving objects. Likewise, the theory of optics explains the properties of light and how it behaves in different media, electromagnetic theory explains the properties of electricity and how to generate it, quantum mechanics explains the properties of subatomic particles, and thermodynamics explains the properties of energy and mechanical work. An introductory university level textbook in physics will likely contain separate chapters devoted to each of these theories. Similar theories are also available in social sciences. For instance, cognitive dissonance theory in psychology explains how people react when their observations of an event are different from what they expected of that event, general deterrence theory explains why some people engage in improper or criminal behaviours, such as to illegally download music or commit software piracy, and the theory of planned behaviour explains how people make conscious reasoned choices in their everyday lives.

The goal of scientific research is to discover laws and postulate theories that can explain natural or social phenomena, or in other words, build scientific knowledge. It is important to understand that this knowledge may be imperfect or even quite far from the truth. Sometimes, there may not be a single universal truth, but rather an equilibrium of ‘multiple truths.’ We must understand that the theories upon which scientific knowledge is based are only explanations of a particular phenomenon as suggested by a scientist. As such, there may be good or poor explanations depending on the extent to which those explanations fit well with reality, and consequently, there may be good or poor theories. The progress of science is marked by our progression over time from poorer theories to better theories, through better observations using more accurate instruments and more informed logical reasoning.

We arrive at scientific laws or theories through a process of logic and evidence. Logic (theory) and evidence (observations) are the two, and only two, pillars upon which scientific knowledge is based. In science, theories and observations are inter-related and cannot exist without each other. Theories provide meaning and significance to what we observe, and observations help validate or refine existing theory or construct new theory. Any other means of knowledge acquisition, such as faith or authority cannot be considered science.

Scientific research

Given that theories and observations are the two pillars of science, scientific research operates at two levels: a theoretical level and an empirical level. The theoretical level is concerned with developing abstract concepts about a natural or social phenomenon and relationships between those concepts (i.e., build ‘theories’), while the empirical level is concerned with testing the theoretical concepts and relationships to see how well they reflect our observations of reality, with the goal of ultimately building better theories. Over time, a theory becomes more and more refined (i.e., fits the observed reality better), and the science gains maturity. Scientific research involves continually moving back and forth between theory and observations. Both theory and observations are essential components of scientific research. For instance, relying solely on observations for making inferences and ignoring theory is not considered valid scientific research.

Depending on a researcher’s training and interest, scientific inquiry may take one of two possible forms: inductive or deductive. In inductive research , the goal of a researcher is to infer theoretical concepts and patterns from observed data. In deductive research , the goal of the researcher is to test concepts and patterns known from theory using new empirical data. Hence, inductive research is also called theory-building research, and deductive research is theory-testing research. Note here that the goal of theory testing is not just to test a theory, but possibly to refine, improve, and extend it. Figure 1.1 depicts the complementary nature of inductive and deductive research. Note that inductive and deductive research are two halves of the research cycle that constantly iterates between theory and observations. You cannot do inductive or deductive research if you are not familiar with both the theory and data components of research. Naturally, a complete researcher is one who can traverse the entire research cycle and can handle both inductive and deductive research.

It is important to understand that theory-building (inductive research) and theory-testing (deductive research) are both critical for the advancement of science. Elegant theories are not valuable if they do not match with reality. Likewise, mountains of data are also useless until they can contribute to the construction of meaningful theories. Rather than viewing these two processes in a circular relationship, as shown in Figure 1.1, perhaps they can be better viewed as a helix, with each iteration between theory and data contributing to better explanations of the phenomenon of interest and better theories. Though both inductive and deductive research are important for the advancement of science, it appears that inductive (theory-building) research is more valuable when there are few prior theories or explanations, while deductive (theory-testing) research is more productive when there are many competing theories of the same phenomenon and researchers are interested in knowing which theory works best and under what circumstances.

Theory building and theory testing are particularly difficult in the social sciences, given the imprecise nature of the theoretical concepts, inadequate tools to measure them, and the presence of many unaccounted for factors that can also influence the phenomenon of interest. It is also very difficult to refute theories that do not work. For instance, Karl Marx’s theory of communism as an effective means of economic production withstood for decades, before it was finally discredited as being inferior to capitalism in promoting economic growth and social welfare. Erstwhile communist economies like the Soviet Union and China eventually moved toward more capitalistic economies characterised by profit-maximising private enterprises. However, the recent collapse of the mortgage and financial industries in the United States demonstrates that capitalism also has its flaws and is not as effective in fostering economic growth and social welfare as previously presumed. Unlike theories in the natural sciences, social science theories are rarely perfect, which provides numerous opportunities for researchers to improve those theories or build their own alternative theories.

Conducting scientific research, therefore, requires two sets of skills—theoretical and methodological—needed to operate in the theoretical and empirical levels respectively. Methodological skills (‘know-how’) are relatively standard, invariant across disciplines, and easily acquired through doctoral programs. However, theoretical skills (‘know-what’) are considerably harder to master, require years of observation and reflection, and are tacit skills that cannot be ‘taught’ but rather learned though experience. All of the greatest scientists in the history of mankind, such as Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Niels Bohr, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, and Herbert Simon, were master theoreticians, and they are remembered for the theories they postulated that transformed the course of science. Methodological skills are needed to be an ordinary researcher, but theoretical skills are needed to be an extraordinary researcher!

Scientific method

In the preceding sections, we described science as knowledge acquired through a scientific method. So what exactly is the ‘scientific method’? Scientific method refers to a standardised set of techniques for building scientific knowledge, such as how to make valid observations, how to interpret results, and how to generalise those results. The scientific method allows researchers to independently and impartially test pre-existing theories and prior findings, and subject them to open debate, modifications, or enhancements. The scientific method must satisfy four key characteristics:

Replicability : Others should be able to independently replicate or repeat a scientific study and obtain similar, if not identical, results. Precision : Theoretical concepts, which are often hard to measure, must be defined with such precision that others can use those definitions to measure those concepts and test that theory. Falsifiability : A theory must be stated in such a way that it can be disproven. Theories that cannot be tested or falsified are not scientific theories and any such knowledge is not scientific knowledge. A theory that is specified in imprecise terms or whose concepts are not accurately measureable cannot be tested, and is therefore not scientific. Sigmund Freud’s ideas on psychoanalysis fall into this category and are therefore not considered a ‘theory’, even though psychoanalysis may have practical utility in treating certain types of ailments. Parsimony: When there are multiple different explanations of a phenomenon, scientists must always accept the simplest or logically most economical explanation. This concept is called parsimony or ‘Occam’s razor’. Parsimony prevents scientists from pursuing overly complex or outlandish theories with an endless number of concepts and relationships that may explain a little bit of everything but nothing in particular. Any branch of inquiry that does not allow the scientific method to test its basic laws or theories cannot be called ‘science’. For instance, theology (the study of religion) is not science because theological ideas—such as the presence of God—cannot be tested by independent observers using a logical, confirmable, repeatable, and scrutinisable. Similarly, arts, music, literature, humanities, and law are also not considered science, even though they are creative and worthwhile endeavours in their own right.

The scientific method, as applied to social sciences, includes a variety of research approaches, tools, and techniques for collecting and analysing qualitative or quantitative data. These methods include laboratory experiments, field surveys, case research, ethnographic research, action research, and so forth. Much of this book is devoted to learning about these different methods. However, recognise that the scientific method operates primarily at the empirical level of research, i.e., how to make observations and analyse these observations. Very little of this method is directly pertinent to the theoretical level, which is really the more challenging part of scientific research.

Types of scientific research

Depending on the purpose of research, scientific research projects can be grouped into three types: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. Exploratory research is often conducted in new areas of inquiry, where the goals of the research are: to scope out the magnitude or extent of a particular phenomenon, problem, or behaviour, to generate some initial ideas (or ‘hunches’) about that phenomenon, or to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study regarding that phenomenon. For instance, if the citizens of a country are generally dissatisfied with governmental policies during an economic recession, exploratory research may be directed at measuring the extent of citizens’ dissatisfaction, understanding how such dissatisfaction is manifested, such as the frequency of public protests, and the presumed causes of such dissatisfaction, such as ineffective government policies in dealing with inflation, interest rates, unemployment, or higher taxes. Such research may include examination of publicly reported figures, such as estimates of economic indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment, and consumer price index (CPI), as archived by third-party sources, obtained through interviews of experts, eminent economists, or key government officials, and/or derived from studying historical examples of dealing with similar problems. This research may not lead to a very accurate understanding of the target problem, but may be worthwhile in scoping out the nature and extent of the problem and serve as a useful precursor to more in-depth research.

Descriptive research is directed at making careful observations and detailed documentation of a phenomenon of interest. These observations must be based on the scientific method (i.e., must be replicable, precise, etc.), and therefore, are more reliable than casual observations by untrained people. Examples of descriptive research are tabulation of demographic statistics by the United States Census Bureau or employment statistics by the Bureau of Labor, who use the same or similar instruments for estimating employment by sector or population growth by ethnicity over multiple employment surveys or censuses. If any changes are made to the measuring instruments, estimates are provided with and without the changed instrumentation to allow the readers to make a fair before-and-after comparison regarding population or employment trends. Other descriptive research may include chronicling ethnographic reports of gang activities among adolescent youth in urban populations, the persistence or evolution of religious, cultural, or ethnic practices in select communities, and the role of technologies such as Twitter and instant messaging in the spread of democracy movements in Middle Eastern countries.

Explanatory research seeks explanations of observed phenomena, problems, or behaviours. While descriptive research examines the what, where, and when of a phenomenon, explanatory research seeks answers to questions of why and how. It attempts to ‘connect the dots’ in research, by identifying causal factors and outcomes of the target phenomenon. Examples include understanding the reasons behind adolescent crime or gang violence, with the goal of prescribing strategies to overcome such societal ailments. Most academic or doctoral research belongs to the explanation category, though some amount of exploratory and/or descriptive research may also be needed during initial phases of academic research. Seeking explanations for observed events requires strong theoretical and interpretation skills, along with intuition, insights, and personal experience. Those who can do it well are also the most prized scientists in their disciplines.

History of scientific thought

Before closing this chapter, it may be interesting to go back in history and see how science has evolved over time and identify the key scientific minds in this evolution. Although instances of scientific progress have been documented over many centuries, the terms ‘science’, ’scientists’, and the ‘scientific method’ were coined only in the nineteenth century. Prior to this time, science was viewed as a part of philosophy, and coexisted with other branches of philosophy such as logic, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, although the boundaries between some of these branches were blurred.

In the earliest days of human inquiry, knowledge was usually recognised in terms of theological precepts based on faith. This was challenged by Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates during the third century BC, who suggested that the fundamental nature of being and the world can be understood more accurately through a process of systematic logical reasoning called rationalism . In particular, Aristotle’s classic work Metaphysics (literally meaning ‘beyond physical [existence]’) separated theology (the study of Gods) from ontology (the study of being and existence) and universal science (the study of first principles, upon which logic is based). Rationalism (not to be confused with ‘rationality’) views reason as the source of knowledge or justification, and suggests that the criterion of truth is not sensory but rather intellectual and deductive, often derived from a set of first principles or axioms (such as Aristotle’s ‘law of non-contradiction’).

The next major shift in scientific thought occurred during the sixteenth century, when British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) suggested that knowledge can only be derived from observations in the real world. Based on this premise, Bacon emphasised knowledge acquisition as an empirical activity (rather than as a reasoning activity), and developed empiricism as an influential branch of philosophy. Bacon’s works led to the popularisation of inductive methods of scientific inquiry, the development of the ‘scientific method’ (originally called the ‘Baconian method’), consisting of systematic observation, measurement, and experimentation, and may have even sowed the seeds of atheism or the rejection of theological precepts as ‘unobservable’.

Empiricism continued to clash with rationalism throughout the Middle Ages, as philosophers sought the most effective way of gaining valid knowledge. French philosopher Rene Descartes sided with the rationalists, while British philosophers John Locke and David Hume sided with the empiricists. Other scientists, such as Galileo Galilei and Sir Isaac Newton, attempted to fuse the two ideas into natural philosophy (the philosophy of nature), to focus specifically on understanding nature and the physical universe, which is considered to be the precursor of the natural sciences. Galileo (1564–1642) was perhaps the first to state that the laws of nature are mathematical, and contributed to the field of astronomy through an innovative combination of experimentation and mathematics.

In the eighteenth century, German philosopher Immanuel Kant sought to resolve the dispute between empiricism and rationalism in his book Critique of pure r eason by arguing that experiences are purely subjective and processing them using pure reason without first delving into the subjective nature of experiences will lead to theoretical illusions. Kant’s ideas led to the development of German idealism , which inspired later development of interpretive techniques such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, and critical social theory.

At about the same time, French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857), founder of the discipline of sociology, attempted to blend rationalism and empiricism in a new doctrine called positivism . He suggested that theory and observations have circular dependence on each other. While theories may be created via reasoning, they are only authentic if they can be verified through observations. The emphasis on verification started the separation of modern science from philosophy and metaphysics and further development of the ‘scientific method’ as the primary means of validating scientific claims. Comte’s ideas were expanded by Emile Durkheim in his development of sociological positivism (positivism as a foundation for social research) and Ludwig Wittgenstein in logical positivism.

In the early twentieth century, strong accounts of positivism were rejected by interpretive sociologists (antipositivists) belonging to the German idealism school of thought. Positivism was typically equated with quantitative research methods such as experiments and surveys and without any explicit philosophical commitments, while antipositivism employed qualitative methods such as unstructured interviews and participant observation. Even practitioners of positivism, such as American sociologist Paul Lazarsfield who pioneered large-scale survey research and statistical techniques for analysing survey data, acknowledged potential problems of observer bias and structural limitations in positivist inquiry. In response, antipositivists emphasised that social actions must be studied though interpretive means based upon understanding the meaning and purpose that individuals attach to their personal actions, which inspired Georg Simmel’s work on symbolic interactionism, Max Weber’s work on ideal types, and Edmund Husserl’s work on phenomenology.

In the mid-to-late twentieth century, both positivist and antipositivist schools of thought were subjected to criticisms and modifications. British philosopher Sir Karl Popper suggested that human knowledge is based not on unchallengeable, rock solid foundations, but rather on a set of tentative conjectures that can never be proven conclusively, but only disproven. Empirical evidence is the basis for disproving these conjectures or ‘theories’. This metatheoretical stance, called postpositivism (or postempiricism), amends positivism by suggesting that it is impossible to verify the truth although it is possible to reject false beliefs, though it retains the positivist notion of an objective truth and its emphasis on the scientific method.

Likewise, antipositivists have also been criticised for trying only to understand society but not critiquing and changing society for the better. The roots of this thought lie in Das k apital , written by German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which critiqued capitalistic societies as being socially inequitable and inefficient, and recommended resolving this inequity through class conflict and proletarian revolutions. Marxism inspired social revolutions in countries such as Germany, Italy, Russia, and China, but generally failed to accomplish the social equality that it aspired. Critical research (also called critical theory) propounded by Max Horkheimer and Jürgen Habermas in the twentieth century, retains similar ideas of critiquing and resolving social inequality, and adds that people can and should consciously act to change their social and economic circumstances, although their ability to do so is constrained by various forms of social, cultural and political domination. Critical research attempts to uncover and critique the restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo by analysing the oppositions, conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and seeks to eliminate the causes of alienation and domination (i.e., emancipate the oppressed class). More on these different research philosophies and approaches will be covered in future chapters of this book.

Social Science Research: Principles, Methods and Practices (Revised edition) Copyright © 2019 by Anol Bhattacherjee is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Ethics in scientific research: a lens into its importance, history, and future

Associated data.

Not applicable.

Introduction

Ethics are a guiding principle that shapes the conduct of researchers. It influences both the process of discovery and the implications and applications of scientific findings 1 . Ethical considerations in research include, but are not limited to, the management of data, the responsible use of resources, respect for human rights, the treatment of human and animal subjects, social responsibility, honesty, integrity, and the dissemination of research findings 1 . At its core, ethics in scientific research aims to ensure that the pursuit of knowledge does not come at the expense of societal or individual well-being. It fosters an environment where scientific inquiry can thrive responsibly 1 .

The need to understand and uphold ethics in scientific research is pertinent in today’s scientific community. First, the rapid advancement of technology and science raises ethical questions in fields like biotechnology, biomedical science, genetics, and artificial intelligence. These advancements raise questions about privacy, consent, and the potential long-term impacts on society and its environment 2 . Furthermore, the rise in public perception and scrutiny of scientific practices, fueled by a more informed and connected populace, demands greater transparency and ethical accountability from researchers and institutions.

This commentary seeks to bring to light the need and benefits associated with ethical adherence. The central theme of this paper highlights how upholding ethics in scientific research is a cornerstone for progress. It buttresses the fact that ethics in scientific research is vital for maintaining the trust of the public, ensuring the safety of participants, and legitimizing scientific findings.

Historical perspective

Ethics in research is significantly shaped by past experiences where a lack of ethical consideration led to negative consequences. One of the most striking examples of ethical misconduct is the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 3 conducted between 1932 and 1972 by the U.S. Public Health Service. In this study, African American men in Alabama were used as subjects to study the natural progression of untreated syphilis. They were not informed of their condition and were denied effective treatment, even after penicillin became available as a cure in the 1940s 3 .

From an ethical lens today, this is a gross violation of informed consent and an exploitation of a vulnerable population. The public outcry following the revelation of the study’s details led to the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research 4 . This commission eventually produced the Belmont Report in 1979 4 , setting forth principles such as respect for persons, beneficence, and justice, which now underpin ethical research practices 4 .

Another example that significantly impacted ethical regulations was the thalidomide tragedy of the late 1950s and early 1960s 5 . Thalidomide was marketed as a safe sedative for pregnant women to combat morning sickness in Europe. Thalidomide resulted in the birth of approximately ten thousand children with severe deformities due to its teratogenic effects 5 , which were not sufficiently researched prior to the drug’s release. This incident underscored the critical need for comprehensive clinical testing and highlighted the ethical imperative of understanding and communicating potential risks, particularly for vulnerable groups such as pregnant women. In response, drug testing regulations became more rigorous, and the importance of informed consent, especially in clinical trials, was emphasized.

The Stanford Prison Experiment of 1971, led by psychologist Philip Zimbardo is another prime example of ethical oversight leading to harmful consequences 6 . The experiment, which aimed to study the psychological effects of perceived power, resulted in emotional trauma for participants. Underestimating potential psychological harm with no adequate systems to safeguard human participants from harm was a breach of ethics in psychological studies 6 . This case highlighted the necessity for ethical guidelines that prioritize the mental and emotional welfare of participants, especially in psychological research. It led to stricter review processes and the establishment of guidelines to prevent psychological harm in research studies. It influenced the American Psychological Association and other bodies to refine their ethical guidelines, ensuring the protection of participants’ mental and emotional well-being.

Impact on current ethical standards

These historical, ethical oversights have been instrumental in shaping the current landscape of ethical standards in scientific research. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study led to the Belmont Report in 1979, which laid out key ethical principles such as respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. It also prompted the establishment of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to oversee research involving human subjects. The thalidomide tragedy catalyzed stricter drug testing regulations and informed consent requirements for clinical trials. The Stanford Prison Experiment influenced the American Psychological Association to refine its ethical guidelines, placing greater emphasis on the welfare and rights of participants.

These historical episodes of ethical oversights have been pivotal in forging the comprehensive ethical frameworks that govern scientific research today. They serve as stark reminders of the potential consequences of ethical neglect and the perpetual need to prioritize the welfare and rights of participants in any research endeavor.

One may ponder on the reason behind the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, where African American men with syphilis were deliberately left untreated. What led scientists to prioritize research outcomes over human well-being? At the time, racial prejudices, lack of understanding of ethical principles in human research, and regulatory oversight made such studies pass. Similarly, the administration of thalidomide to pregnant women initially intended as an antiemetic to alleviate morning sickness, resulted in unforeseen and catastrophic birth defects. This tragedy highlights a critical lapse in the pre-marketing evaluation of drugs’ safety.

Furthermore, the Stanford prison experiment, designed to study the psychological effects of perceived power, spiraled into an ethical nightmare as participants suffered emotional trauma. This begs the question on how these researchers initially justified their methods. From today’s lens of ethics, the studies conducted were a complete breach of misconduct, and I wonder if there were any standards that guided primitive research in science.

Current ethical standards and guidelines in research

Informed consent.

This mandates that participants are fully informed about the nature of the research, including its objectives, procedures, potential risks, and benefits 7 , 8 . They must be given the opportunity to ask questions and must voluntarily agree to participate without coercion 7 , 8 . This ensures respect for individual autonomy and decision-making.

Confidentiality and privacy

Confidentiality is pivotal in research involving human subjects. Participants’ personal information must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure 7 , 8 . Researchers are obliged to take measures to preserve the anonymity and privacy of participants, which fosters trust and encourages participation in research 7 , 8 .

Non-maleficence and beneficence

These principles revolve around the obligation to avoid harm (non-maleficence) and to maximize possible benefits while minimizing potential harm (beneficence) 7 , 8 . Researchers must ensure that their studies do not pose undue risks to participants and that any potential risks are outweighed by the benefits.

Justice in research ethics refers to the fair selection and treatment of research participants 8 . It ensures that the benefits and burdens of research are distributed equitably among different groups in society, preventing the exploitation of vulnerable populations 8 .

The role of Institutional Review Boards (IRB)

Institutional Review Boards play critical roles in upholding ethical standards in research. An IRB is a committee established by an institution conducting research to review, approve, and monitor research involving human subjects 7 , 8 . Their primary role is to ensure that the rights and welfare of participants are protected.

Review and approval

Before a study commences, the IRB reviews the research proposal to ensure it adheres to ethical guidelines. This includes evaluating the risks and benefits, the process of obtaining informed consent, and measures for maintaining confidentiality 7 , 8 .

Monitoring and compliance

IRB also monitors ongoing research projects to ensure compliance with ethical standards. They may require periodic reports and can conduct audits to ensure ongoing adherence to ethical principles 7 , 8 .

Handling ethical violations

In cases where ethical standards are breached, IRB has the authority to impose sanctions, which can range from requiring modifications to the study to completely halting the research project 7 , 8 .

Other agencies and boards enforcing standards

Beyond IRB, there are other regulatory bodies and agencies at national and international levels that enforce ethical standards in research. These include:

The Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) in the United States, which oversees compliance with the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects.

The World Health Organization (WHO) , which provides international ethical guidelines for biomedical research.

The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) , which sets ethical standards for the publication of biomedical research.

These organizations, along with IRB, form a comprehensive network that ensures the ethical conduct of scientific research. They safeguard the integrity of research using the reflections and lesson learnt from the past.

Benefits of ethical research

Credible and reliable outcomes, why is credibility so crucial in research, and how do ethical practices contribute to it.

Ethical practices such as rigorous peer review, transparent methodology, and adherence to established protocols ensure that research findings are reliable and valid 9 . When studies are conducted ethically, they are less likely to be marred by biases, fabrications, or errors that could compromise credibility. For instance, ethical standards demand accurate data reporting and full disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest 9 , which directly contribute to the integrity and trustworthiness of research findings.

How do ethical practices lead to socially beneficial outcomes?

Ethical research practices often align with broader societal values and needs, leading to outcomes that are not only scientifically significant but also socially beneficial. By respecting principles like justice and beneficence, researchers ensure that their work with human subjects contributes positively to society 7 , 8 . For example, ethical guidelines in medical research emphasize the need to balance scientific advancement with patient welfare, ensuring that new treatments are both effective and safe. This balance is crucial in addressing pressing societal health concerns while safeguarding individual rights and well-being.

Trust between the public and the scientific community

The relationship between the public and the scientific community is heavily reliant on trust, which is fostered through consistent ethical conduct in research. When the public perceives that researchers are committed to ethical standards, it reinforces their confidence in the scientific process and its outcomes. Ethical research practices demonstrate a respect for societal norms and values, reinforcing the perception that science serves the public good.

Case studies

Case study 1: the development and approval of covid-19 vaccines.

The development and approval of COVID-19 vaccines within a short time is a testament to how adherence to ethical research practices can achieve credible and beneficial outcomes. Strict adherence to ethical guidelines, even in the face of a global emergency, ensured that the vaccines were developed swiftly. However, safety standards were compromised to some extent as no animal trials were done before humans. The vaccine development was not transparent to the public, and this fuelled the anti-vaccination crowd in some regions. Ethical compliance, including rigorous testing and transparent reporting, should expedite scientific innovation while maintaining public trust.

Case study 2: The CRISPR babies

What ethical concerns were raised by the creation of the crispr babies, and what were the consequences.

The creation of the first genetically edited babies using CRISPR technology in China raised significant ethical concerns 10 . The lack of transparency, inadequate consent process, and potential risks to the children can be likened to ethical misconduct in genetic engineering research. This case resulted in widespread condemnation from the scientific community and the public, as well as international regulatory frameworks and guidelines for genetic editing research 10 .

Recommendation and conclusion

Continuous education and training.

The scientific community should prioritize ongoing education and training in ethics for researchers at all levels, ensuring awareness and understanding of ethical standards and their importance.

Enhanced dialogue and collaboration

Encourage multidisciplinary collaborations and dialogues between scientists, ethicists, policymakers, and the public to address emerging ethical challenges and develop adaptive guidelines.

Fostering a culture of ethical responsibility

Institutions and researchers should cultivate an environment where ethical considerations are integral to the research process, encouraging transparency, accountability, and social responsibility.

Global standards and cooperation

Work toward establishing and harmonizing international ethical standards and regulatory frameworks, particularly in areas like genetic engineering and AI, where the implications of research are global.

Ethics approval

Ethics approval was not required for this editorial.

Informed consent was not required for this editorial

Sources of funding

No funding was received for this research.

Author contribution

G.D.M. wrote this paper.

Conflicts of interest disclosure

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Research registration unique identifying number (UIN)

Goshen David Miteu.

Data availability statement

Provenance and peer review.

Not commissioned, externally peer-reviewed.

Sponsorships or competing interests that may be relevant to content are disclosed at the end of this article.

Published online 21 March 2024

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Scientific Objectivity

Scientific objectivity is a property of various aspects of science. It expresses the idea that scientific claims, methods, results—and scientists themselves—are not, or should not be, influenced by particular perspectives, value judgments, community bias or personal interests, to name a few relevant factors. Objectivity is often considered to be an ideal for scientific inquiry, a good reason for valuing scientific knowledge, and the basis of the authority of science in society.

Many central debates in the philosophy of science have, in one way or another, to do with objectivity: confirmation and the problem of induction; theory choice and scientific change; realism; scientific explanation; experimentation; measurement and quantification; statistical evidence; reproducibility; evidence-based science; feminism and values in science. Understanding the role of objectivity in science is therefore integral to a full appreciation of these debates. As this article testifies, the reverse is true too: it is impossible to fully appreciate the notion of scientific objectivity without touching upon many of these debates.

The ideal of objectivity has been criticized repeatedly in philosophy of science, questioning both its desirability and its attainability. This article focuses on the question of how scientific objectivity should be defined , whether the ideal of objectivity is desirable , and to what extent scientists can achieve it.

1. Introduction

2.1 the view from nowhere, 2.2 theory-ladenness and incommensurability, 2.3 underdetermination, values, and the experimenters’ regress, 3.1 epistemic and contextual values, 3.2 acceptance of scientific hypotheses and value neutrality, 3.3 science, policy and the value-free ideal, 4.1 measurement and quantification, 4.2.1 bayesian inference, 4.2.2 frequentist inference, 4.3 feyerabend: the tyranny of the rational method, 5.1 reproducibility and the meta-analytic perspective, 5.2 feminist and standpoint epistemology, 6.1 max weber and objectivity in the social sciences, 6.2 contemporary rational choice theory, 6.3 evidence-based medicine and social policy, 7. the unity and disunity of scientific objectivity, 8. conclusions, other internet resources, related entries.

Objectivity is a value. To call a thing objective implies that it has a certain importance to us and that we approve of it. Objectivity comes in degrees. Claims, methods, results, and scientists can be more or less objective, and, other things being equal, the more objective, the better. Using the term “objective” to describe something often carries a special rhetorical force with it. The admiration of science among the general public and the authority science enjoys in public life stems to a large extent from the view that science is objective or at least more objective than other modes of inquiry. Understanding scientific objectivity is therefore central to understanding the nature of science and the role it plays in society.

If what is so great about science is its objectivity, then objectivity should be worth defending. The close examinations of scientific practice that philosophers of science have undertaken in the past fifty years have shown, however, that several conceptions of the ideal of objectivity are either questionable or unattainable. The prospects for a science providing a non-perspectival “view from nowhere” or for proceeding in a way uninformed by human goals and values are fairly slim, for example.

This article discusses several proposals to characterize the idea and ideal of objectivity in such a way that it is both strong enough to be valuable, and weak enough to be attainable and workable in practice. We begin with a natural conception of objectivity: faithfulness to facts . We motivate the intuitive appeal of this conception, discuss its relation to scientific method and discuss arguments challenging both its attainability as well as its desirability. We then move on to a second conception of objectivity as absence of normative commitments and value-freedom , and once more we contrast arguments in favor of such a conception with the challenges it faces. A third conception of objectivity which we discuss at length is the idea of absence of personal bias .

Finally there is the idea that objectivity is anchored in scientific communities and their practices . After discussing three case studies from economics, social science and medicine, we address the conceptual unity of scientific objectivity : Do the various conceptions have a common valid core, such as promoting trust in science or minimizing relevant epistemic risks? Or are they rivaling and only loosely related accounts? Finally we present some conjectures about what aspects of objectivity remain defensible and desirable in the light of the difficulties we have encountered.

2. Objectivity as Faithfulness to Facts

The basic idea of this first conception of objectivity is that scientific claims are objective in so far as they faithfully describe facts about the world. The philosophical rationale underlying this conception of objectivity is the view that there are facts “out there” in the world and that it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze, and systematize these facts. “Objective” then becomes a success word: if a claim is objective, it correctly describes some aspect of the world.

In this view, science is objective to the degree that it succeeds at discovering and generalizing facts, abstracting from the perspective of the individual scientist. Although few philosophers have fully endorsed such a conception of scientific objectivity, the idea figures recurrently in the work of prominent twentieth-century philosophers of science such as Carnap, Hempel, Popper, and Reichenbach.

Humans experience the world from a perspective. The contents of an individual’s experiences vary greatly with his perspective, which is affected by his personal situation, and the details of his perceptual apparatus, language and culture. While the experiences vary, there seems to be something that remains constant. The appearance of a tree will change as one approaches it but—according to common sense and most philosophers—the tree itself doesn’t. A room may feel hot or cold for different persons, but its temperature is independent of their experiences. The object in front of me does not disappear just because the lights are turned off.

These examples motivate a distinction between qualities that vary with one’s perspective, and qualities that remain constant through changes of perspective. The latter are the objective qualities. Thomas Nagel explains that we arrive at the idea of objective qualities in three steps (Nagel 1986: 14). The first step is to realize (or postulate) that our perceptions are caused by the actions of things around us, through their effects on our bodies. The second step is to realize (or postulate) that since the same qualities that cause perceptions in us also have effects on other things and can exist without causing any perceptions at all, their true nature must be detachable from their perspectival appearance and need not resemble it. The final step is to form a conception of that “true nature” independently of any perspective. Nagel calls that conception the “view from nowhere”, Bernard Williams the “absolute conception” (Williams 1985 [2011]). It represents the world as it is, unmediated by human minds and other “distortions”.

This absolute conception lies at the basis of scientific realism (for a detailed discussion, see the entry on scientific realism ) and it is attractive in so far as it provides a basis for arbitrating between conflicting viewpoints (e.g., two different observations). Moreover, the absolute conception provides a simple and unified account of the world. Theories of trees will be very hard to come by if they use predicates such as “height as seen by an observer” and a hodgepodge if their predicates track the habits of ordinary language users rather than the properties of the world. To the extent, then, that science aims to provide explanations for natural phenomena, casting them in terms of the absolute conception would help to realize this aim. A scientific account cast in the language of the absolute conception may not only be able to explain why a tree is as tall as it is but also why we see it in one way when viewed from one standpoint and in a different way when viewed from another. As Williams (1985 [2011: 139]) puts it,

[the absolute conception] nonvacuously explain[s] how it itself, and the various perspectival views of the world, are possible.

A third reason to find the view from nowhere attractive is that if the world came in structures as characterized by it and we did have access to it, we could use our knowledge of it to ground predictions (which, to the extent that our theories do track the absolute structures, will be borne out). A fourth and related reason is that attempts to manipulate and control phenomena can similarly be grounded in our knowledge of these structures. To attain any of the four purposes—settling disagreements, explaining the world, predicting phenomena, and manipulation and control—the absolute conception is at best sufficient but not necessary. We can, for instance, settle disagreements by imposing the rule that the person with higher social rank or greater experience is always right. We can explain the world and our image of it by means of theories that do not represent absolute structures and properties, and there is no need to get things (absolutely) right in order to predict successfully. Nevertheless, there is something appealing in the idea that factual disagreements can be settled by the very facts themselves, that explanations and predictions grounded in what’s really there rather than in a distorted image of it.

No matter how desirable, our ability to use scientific claims to represent facts about the world depends on whether these claims can unambiguously be established on the basis of evidence, and of evidence alone. Alas, the relation between evidence and scientific hypothesis is not straightforward. Subsection 2.2 and subsection 2.3 will look at two challenges of the idea that even the best scientific method will yield claims that describe an aperspectival view from nowhere. Section 5.2 will deal with socially motivated criticisms of the view from nowhere.

According to a popular picture, all scientific theories are false and imperfect. Yet, as we add true and eliminate false beliefs, our best scientific theories become more truthlike (e.g., Popper 1963, 1972). If this picture is correct, then scientific knowledge grows by gradually approaching the truth and it will become more objective over time, that is, more faithful to facts. However, scientific theories often change, and sometimes several theories compete for the place of the best scientific account of the world.

It is inherent in the above picture of scientific objectivity that observations can, at least in principle, decide between competing theories. If they did not, the conception of objectivity as faithfulness would be pointless to have as we would not be in a position to verify it. This position has been adopted by Karl R. Popper, Rudolf Carnap and other leading figures in (broadly) empiricist philosophy of science. Many philosophers have argued that the relation between observation and theory is way more complex and that influences can actually run both ways (e.g., Duhem 1906 [1954]; Wittgenstein 1953 [2001]). The most lasting criticism, however, was delivered by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962 [1970]) in his book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”.

Kuhn’s analysis is built on the assumption that scientists always view research problems through the lens of a paradigm, defined by set of relevant problems, axioms, methodological presuppositions, techniques, and so forth. Kuhn provided several historical examples in favor of this claim. Scientific progress—and the practice of normal, everyday science—happens within a paradigm that guides the individual scientists’ puzzle-solving work and that sets the community standards.

Can observations undermine such a paradigm, and speak for a different one? Here, Kuhn famously stresses that observations are “theory-laden” (cf. also Hanson 1958): they depend on a body of theoretical assumptions through which they are perceived and conceptualized. This hypothesis has two important aspects.

First, the meaning of observational concepts is influenced by theoretical assumptions and presuppositions. For example, the concepts “mass” and “length” have different meanings in Newtonian and relativistic mechanics; so does the concept “temperature” in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics (cf. Feyerabend 1962). In other words, Kuhn denies that there is a theory-independent observation language. The “faithfulness to reality” of an observation report is always mediated by a theoretical überbau , disabling the role of observation reports as an impartial, merely fact-dependent arbiter between different theories.

Second, not only the observational concepts, but also the perception of a scientist depends on the paradigm she is working in.

Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists [who work in different paradigms, J.R./J.S.] see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction. (Kuhn 1962 [1970: 150])

That is, our own sense data are shaped and structured by a theoretical framework, and may be fundamentally distinct from the sense data of scientists working in another one. Where a Ptolemaic astronomer like Tycho Brahe sees a sun setting behind the horizon, a Copernican astronomer like Johannes Kepler sees the horizon moving up to a stationary sun. If this picture is correct, then it is hard to assess which theory or paradigm is more faithful to the facts, that is, more objective.

The thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation has also been extended to the incommensurability of different paradigms or scientific theories , problematized independently by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962 [1970]) and Paul Feyerabend (1962). Literally, this concept means “having no measure in common”, and it figures prominently in arguments against a linear and standpoint-independent picture of scientific progress. For instance, the Special Theory of Relativity appears to be more faithful to the facts and therefore more objective than Newtonian mechanics because it reduces, for low speeds, to the latter, and it accounts for some additional facts that are not predicted correctly by Newtonian mechanics. This picture is undermined, however, by two central aspects of incommensurability. First, not only do the observational concepts in both theories differ, but the principles for specifying their meaning may be inconsistent with each other (Feyerabend 1975: 269–270). Second, scientific research methods and standards of evaluation change with the theories or paradigms. Not all puzzles that could be tackled in the old paradigm will be solved by the new one—this is the phenomenon of “Kuhn loss”.

A meaningful use of objectivity presupposes, according to Feyerabend, to perceive and to describe the world from a specific perspective, e.g., when we try to verify the referential claims of a scientific theory. Only within a peculiar scientific worldview, the concept of objectivity may be applied meaningfully. That is, scientific method cannot free itself from the particular scientific theory to which it is applied; the door to standpoint-independence is locked. As Feyerabend puts it:

our epistemic activities may have a decisive influence even upon the most solid piece of cosmological furniture—they make gods disappear and replace them by heaps of atoms in empty space. (1978: 70)

Kuhn and Feyerabend’s theses about theory-ladenness of observation, and their implications for the objectivity of scientific inquiry have been much debated afterwards, and have often been misunderstood in a social constructivist sense. Therefore Kuhn later returned to the topic of scientific objectivity, of which he gives his own characterization in terms of the shared cognitive values of a scientific community. We discuss Kuhn’s later view in section 3.1 . For a more thorough coverage, see the entries on theory and observation in science , the incommensurability of scientific theories and Thomas S. Kuhn .

Scientific theories are tested by comparing their implications with the results of observations and experiments. Unfortunately, neither positive results (when the theory’s predictions are borne out in the data) nor negative results (when they are not) allow unambiguous inferences about the theory. A positive result can obtain even though the theory is false, due to some alternative that makes the same predictions. Finding suspect Jones’ fingerprints on the murder weapon is consistent with his innocence because he might have used it as a kitchen knife. A negative result might be due not to the falsehood of the theory under test but due to the failing of one or more auxiliary assumptions needed to derive a prediction from the theory. Testing, let us say, the implications of Newton’s laws for movements in our planetary system against observations requires assumptions about the number of planets, the sun’s and the planets’ masses, the extent to which the earth’s atmosphere refracts light beams, how telescopes affect the results and so on. Any of these may be false, explaining an inconsistency. The locus classicus for these observations is Pierre Duhem’s The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Duhem 1906 [1954]). Duhem concluded that there was no “crucial experiment”, an experiment that conclusively decides between two alternative theories, in physics (1906 [1954: 188ff.]), and that physicists had to employ their expert judgment or what Duhem called “good sense” to determine what an experimental result means for the truth or falsehood of a theory (1906 [1954: 216ff.]).

In other words, there is a gap between the evidence and the theory supported by it. It is important to note that the alleged gap is more profound than the gap between the premisses of any inductive argument and its conclusion, say, the gap between “All hitherto observed ravens have been black” and “All ravens are black”. The latter gap could be bridged by an agreed upon rule of inductive reasoning. Alas, all attempts to find an analogous rule for theory choice have failed (e.g., Norton 2003). Various philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have responded that theory appraisal is “a complex form of value judgment” (McMullin 1982: 701; see also Kuhn 1977; Hesse 1980; Bloor 1982).

In section 3.1 below we will discuss the nature of the value judgments in more detail. For now the important lesson is that if these philosophers, historians, and sociologists are correct, the “faithfulness to facts” ideal is untenable. As the scientific image of the world is a joint product of the facts and scientists’ value judgments, that image cannot be said to be aperspectival. Science does not eschew the human perspective. There are of course ways to escape this conclusion. If, as John Norton (2003; ms.—see Other Internet Resources) has argued, it is material facts that power and justify inductive inferences, and not value judgments, we can avoid the negative conclusion regarding the view from nowhere. Unsurprisingly, Norton is also critical of the idea that evidence generally underdetermines theory (Norton 2008). However, there are good reasons to mistrust Norton’s optimism regarding the ineliminability of values and other non-factual elements in inductive inferences (Reiss 2020).

There is another, closely related concern. Most of the earlier critics of “objective” verification or falsification focused on the relation between evidence and scientific theories. There is a sense in which the claim that this relation is problematic is not so surprising. Scientific theories contain highly abstract claims that describe states of affairs far removed from the immediacy of sense experience. This is for a good reason: sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception, they must describe a world different from that of sense experience. But surely, one might think, the evidence itself is objective. So even if we do have reasons to doubt that abstract theories faithfully represent the world, we should stand on firmer grounds when it comes to the evidence against which we test abstract theories.

Theories are seldom tested against brute observations, however. Simple generalizations such as “all swans are white” are directly learned from observations (say, of the color of swans) but they do not represent the view from nowhere (for one thing, the view from nowhere doesn’t have colors). Genuine scientific theories are tested against experimental facts or phenomena, which are themselves unobservable to the unaided senses. Experimental facts or phenomena are instead established using intricate procedures of measurement and experimentation.

We therefore need to ask whether the results of scientific measurements and experiments can be aperspectival. In an important debate in the 1980s and 1990s some commentators answered that question with a resounding “no”, which was then rebutted by others. The debate concerns the so-called “experimenter’s regress” (Collins 1985). Collins, a prominent sociologist of science, claims that in order to know whether an experimental result is correct, one first needs to know whether the apparatus producing the result is reliable. But one doesn’t know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results in the first place and so on and so on ad infinitum . Collins’ main case concerns attempts to detect gravitational waves, which were very controversially discussed among physicists in the 1970s.

Collins argues that the circle is eventually broken not by the “facts” themselves but rather by factors having to do with the scientist’s career, the social and cognitive interests of his community, and the expected fruitfulness for future work. It is important to note that in Collins’s view these factors do not necessarily make scientific results arbitrary. But what he does argue is that the experimental results do not represent the world according to the absolute conception. Rather, they are produced jointly by the world, scientific apparatuses, and the psychological and sociological factors mentioned above. The facts and phenomena of science are therefore necessarily perspectival.

In a series of contributions, Allan Franklin, a physicist-turned-philosopher of science, has tried to show that while there are indeed no algorithmic procedures for establishing experimental facts, disagreements can nevertheless be settled by reasoned judgment on the basis of bona fide epistemological criteria such as experimental checks and calibration, elimination of possible sources of error, using apparatuses based on well-corroborated theory and so on (Franklin 1994, 1997). Collins responds that “reasonableness” is a social category that is not drawn from physics (Collins 1994).

The main issue for us in this debate is whether there are any reasons to believe that experimental results provide an aperspectival view on the world. According to Collins, experimental results are co-determined by the facts as well as social and psychological factors. According to Franklin, whatever else influences experimental results other than facts is not arbitrary but instead based on reasoned judgment. What he has not shown is that reasoned judgment guarantees that experimental results reflect the facts alone and are therefore aperspectival in any interesting sense. Another important challenge for the aperspectival account comes from feminist epistemology and other accounts that stress the importance of the construction of scientific knowledge through epistemic communities. These accounts are reviewed in section 5 .

3. Objectivity as Absence of Normative Commitments and the Value-Free Ideal

In the previous section we have presented arguments against the view of objectivity as faithfulness to facts and an impersonal “view from nowhere”. An alternative view is that science is objective to the extent that it is value-free . Why would we identify objectivity with value-freedom or regard the latter as a prerequisite for the former? Part of the answer is empiricism. If science is in the business of producing empirical knowledge, and if differences about value judgments cannot be settled by empirical means, values should have no place in science. In the following we will try to make this intuition more precise.

Before addressing what we will call the “value-free ideal”, it will be helpful to distinguish four stages at which values may affect science. They are: (i) the choice of a scientific research problem; (ii) the gathering of evidence in relation to the problem; (iii) the acceptance of a scientific hypothesis or theory as an adequate answer to the problem on the basis of the evidence; (iv) the proliferation and application of scientific research results (Weber 1917 [1949]).

Most philosophers of science would agree that the role of values in science is contentious only with respect to dimensions (ii) and (iii): the gathering of evidence and the acceptance of scientific theories . It is almost universally accepted that the choice of a research problem is often influenced by interests of individual scientists, funding parties, and society as a whole. This influence may make science more shallow and slow down its long-run progress, but it has benefits, too: scientists will focus on providing solutions to those intellectual problems that are considered urgent by society and they may actually improve people’s lives. Similarly, the proliferation and application of scientific research results is evidently affected by the personal values of journal editors and end users, and little can be done about this. The real debate is about whether or not the “core” of scientific reasoning—the gathering of evidence and the assessment and acceptance scientific theories—is, and should be, value-free.

We have introduced the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence above. The problem does not stop, however, at values being required for filling the gap between theory and evidence. A further complication is that these values can conflict with each other. Consider the classical problem of fitting a mathematical function to a data set. The researcher often has the choice between using a complex function, which makes the relationship between the variables less simple but fits the data more accurately , or postulating a simpler relationship that is less accurate . Simplicity and accuracy are both important cognitive values, and trading them off requires a careful value judgment. However, philosophers of science tend to regard value-ladenness in this sense as benign. Cognitive values (sometimes also called “epistemic” or “constitutive” values) such as predictive accuracy, scope, unification, explanatory power, simplicity and coherence with other accepted theories are taken to be indicative of the truth of a theory and therefore provide reasons for preferring one theory over another (McMullin 1982, 2009; Laudan 1984; Steel 2010). Kuhn (1977) even claims that cognitive values define the shared commitments of science, that is, the standards of theory assessment that characterize the scientific approach as a whole. Note that not every philosopher entertains the same list of cognitive values: subjective differences in ranking and applying cognitive values do not vanish, a point Kuhn made emphatically.

In most views, the objectivity and authority of science is not threatened by cognitive values, but only by non-cognitive or contextual values . Contextual values are moral, personal, social, political and cultural values such as pleasure, justice and equality, conservation of the natural environment and diversity. The most notorious cases of improper uses of such values involve travesties of scientific reasoning, where the intrusion of contextual values led to an intolerant and oppressive scientific agenda with devastating epistemic and social consequences. In the Third Reich, a large part of contemporary physics, such as the theory of relativity, was condemned because its inventors were Jewish; in the Soviet Union, biologist Nikolai Vavilov was sentenced to death (and died in prison) because his theories of genetic inheritance did not match Marxist-Leninist ideology. Both states tried to foster a science that was motivated by political convictions (“Deutsche Physik” in Nazi Germany, Lysenko’s Lamarckian theory of inheritance and denial of genetics), leading to disastrous epistemic and institutional effects.

Less spectacular, but arguably more frequent are cases where research is biased toward the interests of the sponsors, such as tobacco companies, food manufacturers and large pharmaceutic firms (e.g., Resnik 2007; Reiss 2010). This preference bias , defined by Wilholt (2009) as the infringement of conventional standards of the research community with the aim of arriving at a particular result, is clearly epistemically harmful. Especially for sensitive high-stakes issues such as the admission of medical drugs or the consequences of anthropogenic global warming, it seems desirable that research scientists assess theories without being influenced by such considerations. This is the core idea of the

Value-Free Ideal (VFI): Scientists should strive to minimize the influence of contextual values on scientific reasoning, e.g., in gathering evidence and assessing/accepting scientific theories.

According to the VFI, scientific objectivity is characterized by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to cognitive values in stages (ii) and (iii) of the scientific process. See Dorato (2004: 53–54), Ruphy (2006: 190) or Biddle (2013: 125) for alternative formulations.

For value-freedom to be a reasonable ideal, it must not be a goal beyond reach and be attainable at least to some degree. This claim is expressed by the

Value-Neutrality Thesis (VNT): Scientists can—at least in principle—gather evidence and assess/accept theories without making contextual value judgments.

Unlike the VFI, the VNT is not normative: its subject is whether the judgments that scientists make are, or could possibly be, free of contextual values. Similarly, Hugh Lacey (1999) distinguishes three principal components or aspects of value-free science: impartiality, neutrality and autonomy. Impartiality means that theories are solely accepted or appraised in virtue of their contribution to the cognitive values of science, such as truth, accuracy or explanatory power. This excludes the influence of contextual values, as stated above. Neutrality means that scientific theories make no value statements about the world: they are concerned with what there is, not with what there should be. Finally, scientific autonomy means that the scientific agenda is shaped by the desire to increase scientific knowledge, and that contextual values have no place in scientific method.

These three interpretations of value-free science can be combined with each other, or used individually. All of them, however, are subject to criticisms that we examine below. Denying the VNT, or the attainability of Lacey’s three criteria for value-free science, poses a challenge for scientific objectivity: one can either conclude that the ideal of objectivity should be rejected, or develop a conception of objectivity that differs from the VFI.

Lacey’s characterization of value-free science and the VNT were once mainstream positions in philosophy of science. Their widespread acceptance was closely connected to Reichenbach’s famous distinction between context of discovery and context of justification . Reichenbach first made this distinction with respect to the epistemology of mathematics:

the objective relation from the given entities to the solution, and the subjective way of finding it, are clearly separated for problems of a deductive character […] we must learn to make the same distinction for the problem of the inductive relation from facts to theories. (Reichenbach 1938: 36–37)

The standard interpretation of this statement marks contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, as irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory—the relation that is crucial for the objectivity of science. Contextual values are restricted to a matter of individual psychology that may influence the discovery, development and proliferation of a scientific theory, but not its epistemic status.

This distinction played a crucial role in post-World War II philosophy of science. It presupposes, however, a clear-cut distinction between cognitive values on the one hand and contextual values on the other. While this may be prima facie plausible for disciplines such as physics, there is an abundance of contextual values in the social sciences, for instance, in the conceptualization and measurement of a nation’s wealth, or in different ways to measure the inflation rate (cf. Dupré 2007; Reiss 2008). More generally, three major lines of criticism can be identified.

First, Helen Longino (1996) has argued that traditional cognitive values such as consistency, simplicity, breadth of scope and fruitfulness are not purely cognitive or epistemic after all, and that their use imports political and social values into contexts of scientific judgment. According to her, the use of cognitive values in scientific judgments is not always, not even normally, politically neutral. She proposes to juxtapose these values with feminist values such as novelty, ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction, applicability to human needs and diffusion of power, and argues that the use of the traditional value instead of its alternative (e.g., simplicity instead of ontological heterogeneity) can lead to biases and adverse research results. Longino’s argument here is different from the one discussed in section 3.1 . It casts the very distinction between cognitive and contextual values into doubt.

The second argument against the possibility of value-free science is semantic and attacks the neutrality of scientific theories: fact and value are frequently entangled because of the use of so-called “thick” ethical concepts in science (Putnam 2002)—i.e., ethical concepts that have mixed descriptive and normative content. For example, a description such as “dangerous technology” involves a value judgment about the technology and the risks it implies, but it also has a descriptive content: it is uncertain and hard to predict whether using that technology will really trigger those risks. If the use of such terms, where facts and values are inextricably entangled, is inevitable in scientific reasoning, it is impossible to describe hypotheses and results in a value-free manner, undermining the value-neutrality thesis.

Indeed, John Dupré has argued that thick ethical terms are ineliminable from science, at least certain parts of it (Dupré 2007). Dupré’s point is essentially that scientific hypotheses and results concern us because they are relevant to human interests, and thus they will necessarily be couched in a language that uses thick ethical terms. While it will often be possible to translate ethically thick descriptions into neutral ones, the translation cannot be made without losses, and these losses obtain precisely because human interests are involved (see section 6.2 for a case study from social science). According to Dupré, then, many scientific statements are value-free only because their truth or falsity does not matter to us:

Whether electrons have a positive or a negative charge and whether there is a black hole in the middle of our galaxy are questions of absolutely no immediate importance to us. The only human interests they touch (and these they may indeed touch deeply) are cognitive ones, and so the only values that they implicate are cognitive values. (2007: 31)

A third challenge to the VNT, and perhaps the most influential one, was raised first by Richard Rudner in his influential article “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1953). Rudner disputes the core of the VNT and the context of discovery/justification distinction: the idea that the acceptance of a scientific theory can in principle be value-free. First, Rudner argues that

no analysis of what constitutes the method of science would be satisfactory unless it comprised some assertion to the effect that the scientist as scientist accepts or rejects hypotheses . (1953: 2)

This assumption stems from industrial quality control and other application-oriented research. In such contexts, it is often necessary to accept or to reject a hypothesis (e.g., the efficacy of a drug) in order to make effective decisions.

Second, he notes that no scientific hypothesis is ever confirmed beyond reasonable doubt—some probability of error always remains. When we accept or reject a hypothesis, there is always a chance that our decision is mistaken. Hence, our decision is also “a function of the importance , in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting a hypothesis” (1953: 2): we are balancing the seriousness of two possible errors (erroneous acceptance/rejection of the hypothesis) against each other. This corresponds to type I and type II error in statistical inference.

The decision to accept or reject a hypothesis involves a value judgment (at least implicitly) because scientists have to judge which of the consequences of an erroneous decision they deem more palatable: (1) some individuals die of the side effects of a drug erroneously judged to be safe; or (2) other individuals die of a condition because they did not have access to a treatment that was erroneously judged to be unsafe. Hence, ethical judgments and contextual values necessarily enter the scientist’s core activity of accepting and rejecting hypotheses, and the VNT stands refuted. Closely related arguments can be found in Churchman (1948) and Braithwaite (1953). Hempel (1965: 91–92) gives a modified account of Rudner’s argument by distinguishing between judgments of confirmation , which are free of contextual values, and judgments of acceptance . Since even strongly confirming evidence cannot fully prove a universal scientific law, we have to live with a residual “inductive risk” in inferring that law. Contextual values influence scientific methods by determining the acceptable amount of inductive risk (see also Douglas 2000).

But how general are Rudner’s objections? Apparently, his result holds true of applied science, but not necessarily of fundamental research. For the latter domain, two major lines of rebuttals have been proposed. First, Richard Jeffrey (1956) notes that lawlike hypotheses in theoretical science (e.g., the gravitational law in Newtonian mechanics) are characterized by their general scope and not confined to a particular application. Obviously, a scientist cannot fine-tune her decisions to their possible consequences in a wide variety of different contexts. So she should just refrain from the essentially pragmatic decision to accept or reject hypotheses. By restricting scientific reasoning to gathering and interpreting evidence, possibly supplemented by assessing the probability of a hypothesis, Jeffrey tries to save the VNT in fundamental scientific research, and the objectivity of scientific reasoning.

Second, Isaac Levi (1960) observes that scientists commit themselves to certain standards of inference when they become a member of the profession. This may, for example, lead to the statistical rejection of a hypothesis when the observed significance level is smaller than 5%. These community standards may eliminate any room for contextual ethical judgment on behalf of the scientist: they determine when she should accept a hypothesis as established. Value judgments may be implicit in how a scientific community sets standards of inference (compare section 5.1 ), but not in the daily work of an individual scientist (cf. Wilholt 2013).

Both defenses of the VNT focus on the impact of values in theory choice, either by denying that scientists actually choose theories (Jeffrey), or by referring to community standards and restricting the VNT to the individual scientist (Levi). Douglas (2000: 563–565) points out, however, that the “acceptance” of scientific theories is only one of several places for values to enter scientific reasoning, albeit an especially prominent and explicit one. Many decisions in the process of scientific inquiry may conceal implicit value judgments: the design of an experiment, the methodology for conducting it, the characterization of the data, the choice of a statistical method for processing and analyzing data, the interpretational process findings, etc. None of these methodological decisions could be made without consideration of the possible consequences that could occur. Douglas gives, as a case study, a series of experiments where carcinogenic effects of dioxin exposure on rats were probed. Contextual values such as safety and risk aversion affected the conducted research at various stages: first, in the classification of pathological samples as benign or cancerous (over which a lot of expert disagreement occurred), second, in the extrapolation from the high-dose experimental conditions to the more realistic low-dose conditions. In both cases, the choice of a conservative classification or model had to be weighed against the adverse consequences for society that could result from underestimating the risks (see also Biddle 2013).

These diagnoses cast a gloomy light on attempts to divide scientific labor between gathering evidence and determining the degree of confirmation (value-free) on the one hand and accepting scientific theories (value-laden) on the other. The entire process of conceptualizing, gathering and interpreting evidence is so entangled with contextual values that no neat division, as Jeffrey envisions, will work outside the narrow realm of statistical inference—and even there, doubts may be raised ( see section 4.2 ).

Philip Kitcher (2011a: 31–40; see also Kitcher 2011b) gives an alternative argument, based on his idea of “significant truths”. There are simply too many truths that are of no interest whatsoever, such as the total number of offside positions in a low-level football competition. Science, then, doesn’t aim at truth simpliciter but rather at something more narrow: truth worth pursuing from the point of view of our cognitive, practical and social goals. Any truth that is worth pursuing in this sense is what he calls a “significant truth”. Clearly, it is value judgments that help us decide whether or not any given truth is significant.

Kitcher goes on to observing that the process of scientific investigation cannot neatly be divided into a stage in which the research question is chosen, one in which the evidence is gathered and one in which a judgment about the question is made on the basis of the evidence. Rather, the sequence is multiply iterated, and at each stage, the researcher has to decide whether previous results warrant pursuit of the current line of research, or whether she should switch to another avenue. Such choices are laden with contextual values.

Values in science also interact, according to Kitcher, in a non-trivial way. Assume we endorse predictive accuracy as an important goal of science. However, there may not be a convincing strategy to reach this goal in some domain of science, for instance because that domain is characterized by strong non-linear dependencies. In this case, predictive accuracy might have to yield to achieving other values, such as consistency with theories in neighbor domains. Conversely, changing social goals lead to re-evaluations of scientific knowledge and research methods.

Science, then, cannot be value-free because no scientist ever works exclusively in the supposedly value-free zone of assessing and accepting hypotheses. Evidence is gathered and hypotheses are assessed and accepted in the light of their potential for application and fruitful research avenues. Both cognitive and contextual value judgments guide these choices and are themselves influenced by their results.

The discussion so far has focused on the VNT, the practical attainability of the VFI, but little has been said about whether a value-free science is desirable in the first place. This subsection discusses this topic with special attention to informing and advising public policy from a scientific perspective. While the VFI, and many arguments for and against it, can be applied to science as a whole, the interface of science and public policy is the place where the intrusion of values into science is especially salient, and where it is surrounded by the greatest controversy. In the 2009 “Climategate” affair, leaked emails from climate scientists raised suspicions that they were pursuing a particular socio-political agenda that affected their research in an improper way. Later inquiries and reports absolved them from charges of misconduct, but the suspicions alone did much to damage the authority of science in the public arena.

Indeed, many debates at the interface of science and public policy are characterized by disagreements on propositions that combine a factual basis with specific goals and values. Take, for instance, the view that growing transgenic crops carries too much risk in terms of biosecurity, or addressing global warming by phasing out fossil energies immediately. The critical question in such debates is whether there are theses \(T\) such that one side in the debate endorses \(T\), the other side rejects it, the evidence is shared, and both sides have good reasons for their respective positions.

According to the VFI, scientists should uncover an epistemic, value-free basis for resolving such disagreements and restrict the dissent to the realm of value judgments. Even if the VNT should turn out to be untenable, and a strict separation to be impossible, the VFI may have an important function for guiding scientific research and for minimizing the impact of values on an objective science. In the philosophy of science, one camp of scholars defends the VFI as a necessary antidote to individual and institutional interests, such as Hugh Lacey (1999, 2002), Ernan McMullin (1982) and Sandra Mitchell (2004), while others adopt a critical attitude, such as Helen Longino (1990, 1996), Philip Kitcher (2011a) and Heather Douglas (2009). These criticisms we discuss mainly refer to the desirability or the conceptual (un)clarity of the VFI.

First, it has been argued that the VFI is not desirable at all. Feminist philosophers (e.g., Harding 1991; Okruhlik 1994; Lloyd 2005) have argued that science often carries a heavy androcentric values, for instance in biological theories about sex, gender and rape. The charge against these values is not so much that they are contextual rather than cognitive, but that they are unjustified. Moreover, if scientists did follow the VFI rigidly, policy-makers would pay even less attention to them, with a detrimental effect on the decisions they take (Cranor 1993). Given these shortcomings, the VFI has to be rethought if it is supposed to play a useful role for guiding scientific research and leading to better policy decisions. Section 4.3 and section 5.2 elaborate on this line of criticism in the context of scientific community practices, and a science in the service of society.

Second, the autonomy of science often fails in practice due to the presence of external stakeholders, such as funding agencies and industry lobbies. To save the epistemic authority of science, Douglas (2009: 7–8) proposes to detach it from its autonomy by reformulating the VFI and distinguishing between direct and indirect roles of values in science . Contextual values may legitimately affect the assessment of evidence by indicating the appropriate standard of evidence, the representation of complex processes, the severity of consequences of a decision, the interpretation of noisy datasets, and so on (see also Winsberg 2012). This concerns, above all, policy-related disciplines such as climate science or economics that routinely perform scientific risk analyses for real-world problems (cf. also Shrader-Frechette 1991). Values should, however, not be “reasons in themselves”, that is, evidence or defeaters for evidence (direct role, illegitimate) and as “helping to decide what should count as a sufficient reason for a choice” (indirect role, legitimate). This prohibition for values to replace or dismiss scientific evidence is called detached objectivity by Douglas, but it is complemented by various other aspects that relate to a reflective balancing of various perspectives and the procedural, social aspects of science (2009: ch. 6).

That said, Douglas’ proposal is not very concrete when it comes to implementation, e.g., regarding the way diverse values should be balanced. Compromising in the middle cannot be the solution (Weber 1917 [1949]). First, no standpoint is, just in virtue of being in the middle, evidentially supported vis-à-vis more extreme positions. Second, these middle positions are also, from a practical point of view, the least functional when it comes to advising policy-makers.

Moreover, the distinction between direct and indirect roles of values in science may not be sufficiently clear-cut to police the legitimate use of values in science, and to draw the necessary borderlines. Assume that a scientist considers, for whatever reason, the consequences of erroneously accepting hypothesis \(H\) undesirable. Therefore he uses a statistical model whose results are likely to favor ¬\(H\) over \(H\). Is this a matter of reasonable conservativeness? Or doesn’t it amount to reasoning to a foregone conclusion, and to treating values as evidence (cf. Elliott 2011: 320–321)?

The most recent literature on values and evidence in science presents us with a broad spectrum of opinions. Steele (2012) and Winsberg (2012) agree that probabilistic assessments of uncertainty involve contextual value judgments. While Steele defends this point by analyzing the role of scientists as policy advisors, Winsberg points to the influence of contextual values in the selection and representation of physical processes in climate modeling. Betz (2013) argues, by contrast, that scientists can largely avoid making contextual value judgments if they carefully express the uncertainty involved with their evidential judgments, e.g., by using a scale ranging from purely qualitative evidence (such as expert judgment) to precise probabilistic assessments. The issue of value judgments at earlier stages of inquiry is not addressed by this proposal; however, disentangling evidential judgments and judgments involving contextual values at the stage of theory assessment may be a good thing in itself.

Thus, should we or should we not worried about values in scientific reasoning? While the interplay of values and evidential considerations need not be pernicious, it is unclear why it adds to the success or the authority of science. How are we going to ensure that the permissive attitude towards values in setting evidential standards etc. is not abused? In the absence of a general theory about which contextual values are beneficial and which are pernicious, the VFI might as well be as a first-order approximation to a sound, transparent and objective science.

4. Objectivity as Freedom from Personal Biases

This section deals with scientific objectivity as a form of intersubjectivity—as freedom from personal biases. According to this view, science is objective to the extent that personal biases are absent from scientific reasoning, or that they can be eliminated in a social process. Perhaps all science is necessarily perspectival. Perhaps we cannot sensibly draw scientific inferences without a host of background assumptions, which may include assumptions about values. Perhaps all scientists are biased in some way. But objective scientific results do not, or so the argument goes, depend on researchers’ personal preferences or experiences—they are the result of a process where individual biases are gradually filtered out and replaced by agreed upon evidence. That, among other things, is what distinguishes science from the arts and other human activities, and scientific knowledge from a fact-independent social construction (e.g., Haack 2003).

Paradigmatic ways to achieve objectivity in this sense are measurement and quantification. What has been measured and quantified has been verified relative to a standard. The truth, say, that the Eiffel Tower is 324 meters tall is relative to a standard unit and conventions about how to use certain instruments, so it is neither aperspectival nor free from assumptions, but it is independent of the person making the measurement.

We will begin with a discussion of objectivity, so conceived, in measurement, discuss the ideal of “mechanical objectivity” and then investigate to what extent freedom from personal biases can be implemented in statistical evidence and inductive inference—arguably the core of scientific reasoning, especially in quantitatively oriented sciences. Finally, we discuss Feyerabend’s radical criticism of a rational scientific method that can be mechanically applied, and his defense of the epistemic and social benefits of personal “bias” and idiosyncrasy.

Measurement is often thought to epitomize scientific objectivity, most famously captured in Lord Kelvin’s dictum

when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science , whatever the matter may be. (Kelvin 1883, 73)

Measurement can certainly achieve some independence of perspective. Yesterday’s weather in Durham UK may have been “really hot” to the average North Eastern Brit and “very cold” to the average Mexican, but they’ll both accept that it was 21°C. Clearly, however, measurement does not result in a “view from nowhere”, nor are typical measurement results free from presuppositions. Measurement instruments interact with the environment, and so results will always be a product of both the properties of the environment we aim to measure as well as the properties of the instrument. Instruments, thus, provide a perspectival view on the world (cf. Giere 2006).

Moreover, making sense of measurement results requires interpretation. Consider temperature measurement. Thermometers function by relating an unobservable quantity, temperature, to an observable quantity, expansion (or length) of a fluid or gas in a glass tube; that is, thermometers measure temperature by assuming that length is a function of temperature: length = \(f\)(temperature). The function \(f\) is not known a priori , and it cannot be tested either (because it could in principle only be tested using a veridical thermometer, and the veridicality of the thermometer is just what is at stake here). Making a specific assumption, for instance that \(f\) is linear, solves that problem by fiat. But this “solution” does not take us very far because different thermometric substances (e.g., mercury, air or water) yield different results for the points intermediate between the two fixed points 0°C and 100°C, and so they can’t all expand linearly.

According to Hasok Chang’s account of early thermometry (Chang 2004), the problem was eventually solved by using a “principle of minimalist overdetermination”, the goal of which was to find a reliable thermometer while making as few substantial assumptions (e.g., about the form for \(f\)) as possible. It was argued that if a thermometer was to be reliable, different tokens of the same thermometer type should agree with each other, and the results of air thermometers agreed the most. “Minimal” doesn’t mean zero, however, and indeed this procedure makes an important presupposition (in this case a metaphysical assumption about the one-valuedness of a physical quantity). Moreover, the procedure yielded at best a reliable instrument, not necessarily one that was best at tracking the uniquely real temperature (if there is such a thing).

What Chang argues about early thermometry is true of measurements more generally: they are always made against a backdrop of metaphysical presuppositions, theoretical expectations and other kinds of belief. Whether or not any given procedure is regarded as adequate depends to a large extent on the purposes pursued by the individual scientist or group of scientists making the measurements. Especially in the social sciences, this often means that measurement procedures are laden with normative assumptions, i.e., values.

Julian Reiss (2008, 2013) has argued that economic indicators such as consumer price inflation, gross domestic product and the unemployment rate are value-laden in this sense. Consumer-price indices, for instance, assume that if a consumer prefers a bundle \(x\) over an alternative \(y\), then \(x\) is better for her than \(y\), which is as ethically charged as it is controversial. National income measures assume that nations that exchange a larger share of goods and services on markets are richer than nations where the same goods and services are provided by the government or within households, which too is ethically charged and controversial.

While not free of assumptions and values, the goal of many measurement procedures remains to reduce the influence of personal biases and idiosyncrasies. The Nixon administration, famously, indexed social security payments to the consumer-price index in order to eliminate the dependence of security recipients on the flimsiest of party politics: to make increases automatic instead of a result of political negotiations (Nixon 1969). Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison refer to this as mechanical objectivity . They write:

Finally, we come to the full-fledged establishment of mechanical objectivity as the ideal of scientific representation. What we find is that the image, as standard bearer of is objectivity is tied to a relentless search to replace individual volition and discretion in depiction by the invariable routines of mechanical reproduction. (Daston and Galison 1992: 98)

Mechanical objectivity reduces the importance of human contributions to scientific results to a minimum, and therefore enables science to proceed on a large scale where bonds of trust between individuals can no longer hold (Daston 1992). Trust in mechanical procedures thus replaces trust in individual scientists.

In his book Trust in Numbers , Theodore Porter pursues this line of thought in great detail. In particular, on the basis of case studies involving British actuaries in the mid-nineteenth century, of French state engineers throughout the century, and of the US Army Corps of Engineers from 1920 to 1960, he argues for two causal claims. First, measurement instruments and quantitative procedures originate in commercial and administrative needs and affect the ways in which the natural and social sciences are practiced, not the other way around. The mushrooming of instruments such as chemical balances, barometers, chronometers was largely a result of social pressures and the demands of democratic societies. Administering large territories or controlling diverse people and processes is not always possible on the basis of personal trust and thus “objective procedures” (which do not require trust in persons) took the place of “subjective judgments” (which do). Second, he argues that quantification is a technology of distrust and weakness, and not of strength. It is weak administrators who do not have the social status, political support or professional solidarity to defend their experts’ judgments. They therefore subject decisions to public scrutiny, which means that they must be made in a publicly accessible form.

This is the situation in which scientists who work in areas where the science/policy boundary is fluid find themselves:

The National Academy of Sciences has accepted the principle that scientists should declare their conflicts of interest and financial holdings before offering policy advice, or even information to the government. And while police inspections of notebooks remain exceptional, the personal and financial interests of scientists and engineers are often considered material, especially in legal and regulatory contexts. Strategies of impersonality must be understood partly as defenses against such suspicions […]. Objectivity means knowledge that does not depend too much on the particular individuals who author it. (Porter 1995: 229)

Measurement and quantification help to reduce the influence of personal biases and idiosyncrasies and they reduce the need to trust the scientist or government official, but often at a cost. Standardizing scientific procedures becomes difficult when their subject matters are not homogeneous, and few domains outside fundamental physics are. Attempts to quantify procedures for treatment and policy decisions that we find in evidence-based practices are currently transferred to a variety of sciences such as medicine, nursing, psychology, education and social policy. However, they often lack a certain degree of responsiveness to the peculiarities of their subjects and the local conditions to which they are applied (see also section 5.3 ).

Moreover, the measurement and quantification of characteristics of scientific interest is only half of the story. We also want to describe relations between the quantities and make inferences using statistical analysis. Statistics thus helps to quantify further aspects of scientific work. We will now examine whether or not statistical analysis can proceed in a way free from personal biases and idiosyncrasies—for more detail, see the entry on philosophy of statistics .

4.2 Statistical Evidence

The appraisal of scientific evidence is traditionally regarded as a domain of scientific reasoning where the ideal of scientific objectivity has strong normative force, and where it is also well-entrenched in scientific practice. Episodes such as Galilei’s observations of the Jupiter moons, Lavoisier’s calcination experiments, and Eddington’s observation of the 1919 eclipse are found in all philosophy of science textbooks because they exemplify how evidence can be persuasive and compelling to scientists with different backgrounds. The crucial question is therefore: can we identify an “objective” concept of scientific evidence that is independent of the personal biases of the experimenter and interpreter?

Inferential statistics—the field that investigates the validity of inferences from data to theory—tries to answer this question. It is extremely influential in modern science, pervading experimental research as well as the assessment and acceptance of our most fundamental theories. For instance, a statistical argument helped to establish the recent discovery of the Higgs Boson. We now compare the main theories of statistical evidence with respect to the objectivity of the claims they produce. They mainly differ with respect to the role of an explicitly subjective interpretation of probability.

Bayesian inference quantifies scientific evidence by means of probabilities that are interpreted as a scientist’s subjective degrees of belief. The Bayesian thus leaves behind Carnap’s (1950) idea that probability is determined by a logical relation between sentences. For example, the prior degree of belief in hypothesis \(H\), written \(p(H)\), can in principle take any value in the interval \([0,1]\). Simultaneously held degrees of belief in different hypotheses are, however, constrained by the laws of probability. After learning evidence E, the degree of belief in \(H\) is changed from its prior probability \(p(H)\) to the conditional degree of belief \(p(H \mid E)\), commonly called the posterior probability of \(H\). Both quantities can be related to each other by means of Bayes’ Theorem .

These days, the Bayesian approach is extremely influential in philosophy and rapidly gaining ground across all scientific disciplines. For quantifying evidence for a hypothesis, Bayesian statisticians almost uniformly use the Bayes factor , that is, the ratio of prior to posterior odds in favor of a hypothesis. The Bayes factor in favor of hypothesis \(H\) against its negation \(\neg\)\(H\) in the light of evidence \(E\) can be written as

or in other words, as the likelihood ratio between \(H\) and \(\neg\)\(H\). The Bayes factor reduces to the likelihoodist conception of evidence (Royall 1997) for the case of two competing point hypotheses. For further discussion of Bayesian measures of evidence, see Good (1950), Sprenger and Hartmann (2019: ch. 1) and the entry on confirmation and evidential support .

Unsurprisingly, the idea to measure scientific evidence in terms of subjective probability has met resistance. For example, the statistician Ronald A. Fisher (1935: 6–7) has argued that measuring psychological tendencies cannot be relevant for scientific inquiry and sustain claims to objectivity. Indeed, how should scientific objectivity square with subjective degree of belief? Bayesians have responded to this challenge in various ways:

Howson (2000) and Howson and Urbach (2006) consider the objection misplaced. In the same way that deductive logic does not judge the correctness of the premises but just advises you what to infer from them, Bayesian inductive logic provides rational rules for representing uncertainty and making inductive inferences. Choosing the premises (e.g., the prior distributions) “objectively” falls outside the scope of Bayesian analysis.

Convergence or merging-of-opinion theorems guarantee that under certain circumstances, agents with very different initial attitudes who observe the same evidence will obtain similar posterior degrees of belief in the long run. However, they are asymptotic results without direct implications for inference with real-life datasets (see also Earman 1992: ch. 6). In such cases, the choice of the prior matters, and it may be beset with idiosyncratic bias and manifest social values.

Adopting a more modest stance, Sprenger (2018) accepts that Bayesian inference does not achieve the goal of objectivity in the sense of intersubjective agreement (concordant objectivity), or being free of personal values, bias and subjective judgment. However, he argues that competing schools of inference such as frequentist inference face this problem to the same degree, perhaps even worse. Moreover, some features of Bayesian inference (e.g., the transparency about prior assumptions) fit recent, socially oriented conceptions of objectivity that we discuss in section 5 .

A radical Bayesian solution to the problem of personal bias is to adopt a principle that radically constrains an agent’s rational degrees of belief, such as the Principle of Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt—Jaynes 1968; Williamson 2010). According to MaxEnt, degrees of belief must be probabilistic and in sync with empirical constraints, but conditional on these constraints, they must be equivocal, that is, as middling as possible. This latter constraint amounts to maximizing the entropy of the probability distribution in question. The MaxEnt approach eliminates various sources of subjective bias at the expense of narrowing down the range of rational degrees of belief. An alternative objective Bayesian solution consists in so-called “objective priors” : prior probabilities that do not represent an agent’s factual attitudes, but are determined by principles of symmetry, mathematical convenience or maximizing the influence of the data on the posterior (e.g., Jeffreys 1939 [1980]; Bernardo 2012).

Thus, Bayesian inference, which analyzes statistical evidence from the vantage point of rational belief, provides only a partial answer to securing scientific objectivity from personal idiosyncrasy.

The frequentist conception of evidence is based on the idea of the statistical test of a hypothesis . Under the influence of the statisticians Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, tests were often regarded as rational decision procedures that minimize the relative frequency of wrong decisions in a hypothetical series of repetitions of a test (hence the name “frequentism”). Rudner’s argument in section 3.2 has pointed out the limits of this conception of hypothesis tests: the choice of thresholds for acceptance and rejection (i.e., the acceptable type I and II error rates) may reflect contextual value judgments and personal bias. Moreover, the losses associated with erroneously accepting or rejecting that hypothesis depend on the context of application which may be unbeknownst to the experimenter.

Alternatively, scientists can restrict themselves to a purely evidential interpretation of hypothesis tests and leave decisions to policy-makers and regulatory agencies. The statistician and biologist R.A. Fisher (1935, 1956) proposed what later became the orthodox quantification of evidence in frequentist statistics. Suppose a “null” or default hypothesis \(H_0\) denotes that an intervention has zero effect. If the observed data are “extreme” under \(H_0\)—i.e., if it was highly likely to observe a result that agrees better with \(H_0\)—the data provide evidence against the null hypothesis and for the efficacy of the intervention. The epistemological rationale is connected to the idea of severe testing (Mayo 1996): if the intervention were ineffective, we would, in all likelihood, have found data that agree better with the null hypothesis. The strength of evidence against \(H_0\) is equal to the \(p\)-value : the lower it is, the stronger evidence \(E\) speaks against the null hypothesis \(H_0\).

Unlike Bayes factors, this concept of statistical evidence does not depend on personal degrees of belief. However, this does not necessarily mean that \(p\)-values are more objective. First, \(p\)-values are usually classified as “non-significant” (\(p > .05\)), “significant” (\(p < .05\)), “highly significant”, and so on. Not only that these thresholds and labels are largely arbitrary, they also promote publication bias : non-significant findings are often classified as “failed studies” (i.e., the efficacy of the intervention could not be shown), rarely published and end up in the proverbial “file drawer”. Much valuable research is suppressed. Conversely, significant findings may often occur when the null hypothesis is actually true, especially when researchers have been “hunting for significance”. In fact, researchers have an incentive to keep their \(p\)-values low: the stronger the evidence, the more convincing the narrative, the greater the impact—and the higher the chance for a good publication and career-relevant rewards. Moving the goalpost by “p-hacking” outcomes—for example by eliminating outliers, selective reporting or restricting the analysis to a subgroup—evidently biases the research results and compromises the objectivity of experimental research.

In particular, such questionable research practices (QRP) increase the type I error rate, which measures the rate at which false hypotheses are accepted, substantially over its nominal 5% level and contribute to publication bias (Bakker et al. 2012). Ioannidis (2005) concludes that “most published research findings are false”—they are the combined result of a low base rate of effective causal interventions, the file drawer effect and the widespread presence of questionable research practices. The frequentist logic of hypothesis testing aggravates the problem because it provides a framework where all these biases can easily enter (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008; Sprenger 2016). These radical conclusions are also confirmed by empirical findings: in many disciplines researchers fail to replicate findings by other scientific teams. See section 5.1 for more detail.

Summing up our findings, neither of the two major frameworks of statistical inference manages to eliminate all sources of personal bias and idiosyncrasy. The Bayesian considers subjective assumptions to be an irreducible part of scientific reasoning and sees no harm in making them explicit. The frequentist conception of evidence based on \(p\)-values avoids these explicitly subjective elements, but at the price of a misleading impression of objectivity and frequent abuse in practice. A defense of frequentist inference should, in our opinion, stress that the relatively rigid rules for interpreting statistical evidence facilitate communication and assessment of research results in the scientific community—something that is harder to achieve for a Bayesian. We now turn from specific methods for stating and interpreting evidence to a radical criticism of the idea that there is a rational scientific method.

In his writings of the 1970s, Paul Feyerabend launched a profound attack on the rationality and objectivity of scientific method. His position is exceptional in the philosophical literature since traditionally, the threat for objective and successful science is located in contextual rather than epistemic values. Feyerabend turns this view upside down: it is the “tyranny” of rational method, and the emphasis on epistemic rather than contextual values that prevents us from having a science in the service of society. Moreover, he welcomes a diversity of different personal, also idiosyncratic perspectives, thus denying the idea that freedom from personal “bias” is epistemically and socially beneficial.

The starting point of Feyerabend’s criticism of rational method is the thesis that strict epistemic rules such as those expressed by the VFI only suppress an open exchange of ideas, extinguish scientific creativity and prevent a free and truly democratic science. In his classic “Against Method” (1975: chs. 8–13), Feyerabend elaborates on this criticism by examining a famous episode in the history of science. When the Catholic Church objected to Galilean mechanics, it had the better arguments by the standards of seventeenth-century science. Their conservatism in their position was scientifically backed: Galilei’s telescopes were unreliable for celestial observations, and many well-established phenomena (no fixed star parallax, invariance of laws of motion) could not yet be explained in the heliocentric system. With hindsight, Galilei managed to achieve groundbreaking scientific progress just because he deliberately violated rules of scientific reasoning. Hence Feyerabend’s dictum “Anything goes”: no methodology whatsoever is able to capture the creative and often irrational ways by which science deepens our understanding of the world. Good scientific reasoning cannot be captured by rational method, as Carnap, Hempel and Popper postulated.

The drawbacks of an objective, value-free and method-bound view on science and scientific method are not only epistemic. Such a view narrows down our perspective and makes us less free, open-minded, creative, and ultimately, less human in our thinking (Feyerabend 1975: 154). It is therefore neither possible nor desirable to have an objective, value-free science (cf. Feyerabend 1978: 78–79). As a consequence, Feyerabend sees traditional forms of inquiry about our world (e.g., Chinese medicine) on a par with their Western competitors. He denounces appeals to “objective” standards as rhetorical tools for bolstering the epistemic authority of a small intellectual elite (=Western scientists), and as barely disguised statements of preference for one’s own worldview:

there is hardly any difference between the members of a “primitive” tribe who defend their laws because they are the laws of the gods […] and a rationalist who appeals to “objective” standards, except that the former know what they are doing while the latter does not. (1978: 82)

In particular, when discussing other traditions, we often project our own worldview and value judgments into them instead of making an impartial comparison (1978: 80–83). There is no purely rational justification for dismissing other perspectives in favor of the Western scientific worldview—the insistence on our Western approach may be as justified as insisting on absolute space and time after the Theory of Relativity.

The Galilei example also illustrates that personal perspective and idiosyncratic “bias” need not be bad for science. Feyerabend argues further that scientific research is accountable to society and should be kept in check by democratic institutions, and laymen in particular. Their particular perspectives can help to determine the funding agenda and to set ethical standards for scientific inquiry, but also be useful for traditionally value-free tasks such as choosing an appropriate research method and assessing scientific evidence. Feyerabend’s writings on this issue were much influenced by witnessing the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. and the increasing emancipation of minorities, such as Blacks, Asians and Hispanics.

All this is not meant to say that truth loses its function as a normative concept, nor that all scientific claims are equally acceptable. Rather, Feyerabend advocates an epistemic pluralism that accepts diverse approaches to acquiring knowledge. Rather than defending a narrow and misleading ideal of objectivity, science should respect the diversity of values and traditions that drive our inquiries about the world (1978: 106–107). This would put science back into the role it had during the scientific revolution or the Enlightenment: as a liberating force that fought intellectual and political oppression by the sovereign, the nobility or the clergy. Objections to this view are discussed at the end of section 5.2 .

5. Objectivity as a Feature of Scientific Communities and Their Practices

This section addresses various accounts that regard scientific objectivity essentially as a function of social practices in science and the social organization of the scientific community. All these accounts reject the characterization of scientific objectivity as a function of correspondence between theories and the world, as a feature of individual reasoning practices, or as pertaining to individual studies and experiments (see also Douglas 2011). Instead, they evaluate the objectivity of a collective of studies, as well as the methods and community practices that structure and guide scientific research. More precisely, they adopt a meta-analytic perspective for assessing the reliability of scientific results (section 5.1), and they construct objectivity from a feminist perspective: as an open interchange of mutual criticism, or as being anchored in the “situatedness” of our scientific practices and the knowledge we gain ( section 5.2 ).

The collectivist perspective is especially useful when an entire discipline enters a stage of crisis: its members become convinced that a significant proportion of findings are not trustworthy. A contemporary example of such a situation is the replication crisis , which was briefly mentioned in the previous section and concerns the reproducibility of scientific knowledge claims in a variety of different fields (most prominently: psychology, biology, medicine). Large-scale replication projects have noticed that many findings which we considered as an integral part of scientific knowledge failed to replicate in settings that were designed to mimic the original experiment as closely as possible (e.g., Open Science Collaboration 2015). Successful attempts at replicating an experimental result have long been argued to provide evidence of freedom from particular kinds of artefacts and thus the trustworthiness of the result. Compare the entry on experiment in physics . Likewise, failure to replicate indicates that either the original finding, the result of the replication attempt, or both, are biased—though see John Norton’s (ms., ch. 3—see Other Internet Resources) arguments that the evidential value of (failed) replications crucially depends on researchers’ material background assumptions.

When replication failures in a discipline are particularly significant, one may conclude that the published literature lacks objectivity—at a minimum the discipline fails to inspire trust that its findings are more than artefacts of the researchers’ efforts. Conversely, when observed effects can be replicated in follow-up experiments, a kind of objectivity is reached that goes beyond the ideas of freedom from personal bias, mechanical objectivity, and subject-independent measurement, discussed in section 4.1 .

Freese and Peterson (2018) call this idea statistical objectivity . It grounds in the view that even the most scrupulous and diligent researchers cannot achieve full objectivity all by themselves. The term “objectivity” instead applies to a collection or population of studies, with meta-analysis (a formal method for aggregating the results from ranges of studies) as the “apex of objectivity” (Freese and Peterson 2018, 304; see also Stegenga 2011, 2018). In particular, aggregating studies from different researchers may provide evidence of systematic bias and questionable research practices (QRP) in the published literature. This diagnostic function of meta-analysis for detecting violations of objectivity is enhanced by statistical techniques such as the funnel plot and the \(p\)-curve (Simonsohn et al. 2014).

Apart from this epistemic dimension, research on statistical objectivity also has an activist dimension: methodologists urge researchers to make publicly available essential parts of their research before the data analysis starts, and to make their methods and data sources more transparent. For example, it is conjectured that the replicability (and thus objectivity) of science will increase by making all data available online, by preregistering experiments, and by using the registered reports model for journal articles (i.e., the journal decides on publication before data collection on the basis of the significance of the proposed research as well as the experimental design). The idea is that transparency about the data set and the experimental design will make it easier to stage a replication of an experiment and to assess its methodological quality. Moreover, publicly committing to a data analysis plan beforehand will lower the rate of QRPs and of attempts to accommodate data to hypotheses rather than making proper predictions.

All in all, statistical objectivity moves the discussion of objectivity to the level of population of studies. There, it takes up and modifies several conceptions of objectivity that we have seen before: most prominently, freedom of subjective bias, which is replaced with collective bias and pernicious conventions, and the subject-independent measurement of a physical quantity, which is replaced by reproducibility of effects.

Traditional notions of objectivity as faithfulness to facts or freedom of contextual values have also been challenged from a feminist perspective. These critiques can be grouped in three major research programs: feminist epistemology, feminist standpoint theory and feminist postmodernism (Crasnow 2013). The program of feminist epistemology explores the impact of sex and gender on the production of scientific knowledge. More precisely, feminist epistemology highlights the epistemic risks resulting from the systematic exclusion of women from the ranks of scientists, and the neglect of women as objects of study. Prominent case studies are the neglect of female orgasm in biology, testing medical drugs on male participants only, focusing on male specimen when studying the social behavior of primates, and explaining human mating patterns by means of imaginary neolithic societies (e.g., Hrdy 1977; Lloyd 1993, 2005). See also the entry on feminist philosophy of biology .

Often but not always, feminist epistemologists go beyond pointing out what they regard as androcentric bias and reject the value-free ideal altogether—with an eye on the social and moral responsibility of scientific inquiry. They try to show that a value-laden science can also meet important criteria for being epistemically reliable and objective (e.g., Anderson 2004; Kourany 2010). A classical representative of such efforts is Longino’s (1990) contextual empiricism . She reinforces Popper’s insistence that “the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested” (1934 [2002]: 22), but unlike Popper, she conceives scientific knowledge essentially as a social product. Thus, our conception of scientific objectivity must directly engage with the social process that generates knowledge. Longino assigns a crucial function to social systems of criticism in securing the epistemic success of science. Specifically, she develops an epistemology which regards a method of inquiry as “objective to the degree that it permits transformative criticism ” (Longino 1990: 76). For an epistemic community to achieve transformative criticism, there must be:

avenues for criticism : criticism is an essential part of scientific institutions (e.g., peer review);

shared standards : the community must share a set of cognitive values for assessing theories (more on this in section 3.1 );

uptake of criticism : criticism must be able to transform scientific practice in the long run;

equality of intellectual authority : intellectual authority must be shared equally among qualified practitioners.

Longino’s contextual empiricism can be understood as a development of John Stuart Mill’s view that beliefs should never be suppressed, independently of whether they are true or false. Even the most implausible beliefs might be true, and even if they are false, they might contain a grain of truth which is worth preserving or helps to better articulate true beliefs (Mill 1859 [2003: 72]). The underlying intuition is supported by recent empirical research on the epistemic benefits of a diversity of opinions and perspectives (Page 2007). By stressing the social nature of scientific knowledge, and the importance of criticism (e.g., with respect to potential androcentric bias and inclusive practice), Longino’s account fits into the broader project of feminist epistemology.

Standpoint theory undertakes a more radical attack on traditional scientific objectivity. This view develops Marxist ideas to the effect that epistemic position is related to, and a product of, social position. Feminist standpoint theory builds on these ideas but focuses on gender, racial and other social relations. Feminist standpoint theorists and proponents of “situated knowledge” such as Donna Haraway (1988), Sandra Harding (1991, 2015a, 2015b) and Alison Wylie (2003) deny the internal coherence of a view from nowhere: all human knowledge is at base human knowledge and therefore necessarily perspectival. But they argue more than that. Not only is perspectivality the human condition, it is also a good thing to have. This is because perspectives, especially the perspectives of underprivileged classes and groups in society, come along with epistemic benefits. These ideas are controversial but they draw attention to the possibility that attempts to rid science of perspectives might not only be futile but also costly: they prevent scientists from having the epistemic benefits certain standpoints afford and from developing knowledge for marginalized groups in society. The perspectival stance can also explain why criteria for objectivity often vary with context: the relative importance of epistemic virtues is a matter of goals and interests—in other words, standpoint.

By endorsing a perspectival stance, feminist standpoint theory rejects classical elements of scientific objectivity such as neutrality and impartiality (see section 3.1 above). This is a notable difference to feminist epistemology, which is in principle (though not always in practice) compatible with traditional views of objectivity. Feminist standpoint theory is also a political project. For example, Harding (1991, 1993) demands that scientists, their communities and their practices—in other words, the ways through which knowledge is gained—be investigated as rigorously as the object of knowledge itself. This idea she refers to as “strong objectivity” replaces the “weak” conception of objectivity in the empiricist tradition: value-freedom, impartiality, rigorous adherence to methods of testing and inference. Like Feyerabend, Harding integrates a transformation of epistemic standards in science into a broader political project of rendering science more democratic and inclusive. On the other hand, she is exposed to similar objections (see also Haack 2003). Isn’t it grossly exaggerated to identify class, race and gender as important factors in the construction of physical theories? Doesn’t the feminist approach—like social constructivist approaches—lose sight of the particular epistemic qualities of science? Should non-scientists really have as much authority as trained scientists? To whom does the condition of equally shared intellectual authority apply? Nor is it clear—especially in times of fake news and filter bubbles—whether it is always a good idea to subject scientific results to democratic approval. There is no guarantee (arguably there are few good reasons to believe) that democratized or standpoint-based science leads to more reliable theories, or better decisions for society as a whole.

6. Issues in the Special Sciences

So far everything we discussed was meant to apply across all or at least most of the sciences. In this section we will look at a number of specific issues that arise in the social sciences, in economics, and in evidence-based medicine.

There is a long tradition in the philosophy of social science maintaining that there is a gulf in terms of both goals as well as methods between the natural and the social sciences. This tradition, associated with thinkers such as the neo-Kantians Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, the hermeneuticist Wilhelm Dilthey, the sociologist-economist Max Weber, and the twentieth-century hermeneuticists Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michael Oakeshott, holds that unlike the natural sciences whose aim it is to establish natural laws and which proceed by experimentation and causal analysis, the social sciences seek understanding (“ Verstehen ”) of social phenomena, the interpretive examination of the meanings individuals attribute to their actions (Weber 1904 [1949]; Weber 1917 [1949]; Dilthey 1910 [1986]; Windelband 1915; Rickert 1929; Oakeshott 1933; Gadamer 1960 [1989]). See also the entries on hermeneutics and Max Weber .

Understood this way, social science lacks objectivity in more than one sense. One of the more important debates concerning objectivity in the social sciences concerns the role value judgments play and, importantly, whether value-laden research entails claims about the desirability of actions. Max Weber held that the social sciences are necessarily value laden. However, they can achieve some degree of objectivity by keeping out the social researcher’s views about whether agents’ goals are commendable. In a similar vein, contemporary economics can be said to be value laden because it predicts and explains social phenomena on the basis of agents’ preferences. Nevertheless, economists are adamant that economists are not in the business of telling people what they ought to value. Modern economics is thus said to be objective in the Weberian sense of “absence of researchers’ values” —a conception that we discussed in detail in section 3 .

In his widely cited essay “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” (Weber 1904 [1949]), Weber argued that the idea of an aperspectival social science was meaningless:

There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of […] “social phenomena” independent of special and “one-sided” viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes. (1904 [1949: 72]) All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view. (1904 [1949:. 81])

The reason for this is twofold. First, social reality is too complex to admit of full description and explanation. So we have to select. But, perhaps in contraposition to the natural sciences, we cannot just select those aspects of the phenomena that fall under universal natural laws and treat everything else as “unintegrated residues” (1904 [1949: 73]). This is because, second, in the social sciences we want to understand social phenomena in their individuality, that is, in their unique configurations that have significance for us.

Values solve a selection problem. They tell us what research questions we ought to address because they inform us about the cultural importance of social phenomena:

Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to use due to their connection with our values. (1904 [1949: 76])

It is important to note that Weber did not think that social and natural science were different in kind, as Dilthey and others did. Social science too examines the causes of phenomena of interest, and natural science too often seeks to explain natural phenomena in their individual constellations. The role of causal laws is different in the two fields, however. Whereas establishing a causal law is often an end in itself in the natural sciences, in the social sciences laws play an attenuated and accompanying role as mere means to explain cultural phenomena in their uniqueness.

Nevertheless, for Weber social science remains objective in at least two ways. First, once research questions of interest have been settled, answers about the causes of culturally significant phenomena do not depend on the idiosyncrasies of an individual researcher:

But it obviously does not follow from this that research in the cultural sciences can only have results which are “subjective” in the sense that they are valid for one person and not for others. […] For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth. (Weber 1904 [1949: 84], emphasis original)

The claims of social science can therefore be objective in our third sense ( see section 4 ). Moreover, by determining that a given phenomenon is “culturally significant” a researcher reflects on whether or not a practice is “meaningful” or “important”, and not whether or not it is commendable: “Prostitution is a cultural phenomenon just as much as religion or money” (1904 [1949: 81]). An important implication of this view came to the fore in the so-called “ Werturteilsstreit ” (quarrel concerning value judgments) of the early 1900s. In this debate, Weber maintained against the “socialists of the lectern” around Gustav Schmoller the position that social scientists qua scientists should not be directly involved in policy debates because it was not the aim of science to examine the appropriateness of ends. Given a policy goal, a social scientist could make recommendations about effective strategies to reach the goal; but social science was to be value-free in the sense of not taking a stance on the desirability of the goals themselves. This leads us to our conception of objectivity as freedom from value judgments.

Contemporary mainstream economists hold a view concerning objectivity that mirrors Max Weber’s (see above). On the one hand, it is clear that value judgments are at the heart of economic theorizing. “Preferences” are a key concept of rational choice theory, the main theory in contemporary mainstream economics. Preferences are evaluations. If an individual prefers \(A\) to \(B\), she values \(A\) higher than \(B\) (Hausman 2012). Thus, to the extent that economists predict and explain market behavior in terms of rational choice theory, they predict and explain market behavior in a way laden with value judgments.

However, economists are not themselves supposed to take a stance about whether or not whatever individuals value is also “objectively” good in a stronger sense:

[…] that an agent is rational from [rational choice theory]’s point of view does not mean that the course of action she will choose is objectively optimal. Desires do not have to align with any objective measure of “goodness”: I may want to risk swimming in a crocodile-infested lake; I may desire to smoke or drink even though I know it harms me. Optimality is determined by the agent’s desires, not the converse. (Paternotte 2011: 307–8)

In a similar vein, Gul and Pesendorfer write:

However, standard economics has no therapeutic ambition, i.e., it does not try to evaluate or improve the individual’s objectives. Economics cannot distinguish between choices that maximize happiness, choices that reflect a sense of duty, or choices that are the response to some impulse. Moreover, standard economics takes no position on the question of which of those objectives the agent should pursue. (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008: 8)

According to the standard view, all that rational choice theory demands is that people’s preferences are (internally) consistent; it has no business in telling people what they ought to prefer, whether their preferences are consistent with external norms or values. Economics is thus value-laden, but laden with the values of the agents whose behavior it seeks to predict and explain and not with the values of those who seek to predict and explain this behavior.

Whether or not social science, and economics in particular, can be objective in this—Weber’s and the contemporary economists’—sense is controversial. On the one hand, there are some reasons to believe that rational choice theory (which is at work not only in economics but also in political science and other social sciences) cannot be applied to empirical phenomena without referring to external norms or values (Sen 1993; Reiss 2013).

On the other hand, it is not clear that economists and other social scientists qua social scientists shouldn’t participate in a debate about social goals. For one thing, trying to do welfare analysis in the standard Weberian way tends to obscure rather than to eliminate normative commitments (Putnam and Walsh 2007). Obscuring value judgments can be detrimental to the social scientist as policy adviser because it will hamper rather than promote trust in social science. For another, economists are in a prime position to contribute to ethical debates, for a variety of reasons, and should therefore take this responsibility seriously (Atkinson 2001).

The same demands calling for “mechanical objectivity” in the natural sciences and quantification in the social and policy sciences in the nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century are responsible for a recent movement in biomedical research, which, even more recently, have swept to contemporary social science and policy. Early proponents of so-called “evidence-based medicine” made their pursuit of a downplay of the “human element” in medicine plain:

Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiological rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. (Guyatt et al. 1992: 2420)

To call the new movement “evidence-based” is a misnomer strictly speaking, as intuition, clinical experience and pathophysiological rationale can certainly constitute evidence. But proponents of evidence-based practices have a much narrower concept of evidence in mind: analyses of the results of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This movement is now very strong in biomedical research, development economics and a number of areas of social science, especially psychology, education and social policy, and especially in the English speaking world.

The goal is to replace subjective (biased, error-prone, idiosyncratic) judgments by mechanically objective methods. But, as in other areas, attempting to mechanize inquiry can lead to reduced accuracy and utility of the results.

Causal relations in the social and biomedical sciences hold on account of highly complex arrangements of factors and conditions. Whether for instance a substance is toxic depends on details of the metabolic system of the population ingesting it, and whether an educational policy is effective on the constellation of factors that affect the students’ learning progress. If an RCT was conducted successfully, the conclusion about the effectiveness of the treatment (or toxicity of a substance) under test is certain for the particular arrangement of factors and conditions of the trial (Cartwright 2007). But unlike the RCT itself, many of whose aspects can be (relatively) mechanically implemented, applying the result to a new setting (recommending a treatment to a patient, for instance) always involves subjective judgments of the kind proponents of evidence-based practices seek to avoid—such as judgments about the similarity of the test to the target or policy population.

On the other hand, RCTs can be regarded as “debiasing procedure” because they prevent researchers from allocating treatments to patients according to their personal interests, so that the healthiest (or smartest or…) subjects get the researcher’s favorite therapy. While unbalanced allocations can certainly happen by chance, randomization still provides some warrant that the allocation was not done on purpose with a view to promoting somebody’s interests. A priori , the experimental procedure is thus more impartial with respect to the interests at stake. It has thus been argued that RCTs in medicine, while no guarantor of the best outcomes, were adopted by the U.S. Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) to different degrees during the 1960s and 1970s in order to regain public trust in its decisions about treatments, which it had lost due to the thalidomide and other scandals (Teira and Reiss 2013; Teira 2010). It is important to notice, however, that randomization is at best effective with respect to one kind of bias, viz. selection bias. Important other epistemic concerns are not addressed by the procedure but should not be ignored (Worrall 2002).

In sections 2–5, we have encountered various concepts of scientific objectivity and their limitations. This prompts the question of how unified (or disunified) scientific objectivity is as a concept: Is there something substantive shared by all of these analyses? Or is objectivity, as Heather Douglas (2004) puts it, an “irreducibly complex” concept?

Douglas defends pluralism about scientific objectivity and distinguishes three areas of application of the concept: (1) interaction of humans with the world, (2) individual reasoning processes, (3) social processes in science. Within each area, there are various distinct senses which are again irreducible to each other and do not have a common core meaning. This does not mean that the senses are unrelated; they share a complex web of relationships and can also support each other—for example, eliminating values from reasoning may help to achieve procedural objectivity. For Douglas, reducing objectivity to a single core meaning would be a simplification without benefits; instead of a complex web of relations between different senses of objectivity we would obtain an impoverished concept out of touch with scientific practice. Similar arguments and pluralist accounts can be found in Megill (1994), Janack (2002) and Padovani et al. (2015)—see also Axtell (2016).

It has been argued, however, that pluralist approaches give up too quickly on the idea that the different senses of objectivity share one or several important common elements. As we have seen in section 4.1 and 5.1 , scientific objectivity and trust in science are closely connected. Scientific objectivity is desirable because to the extent that science is objective we have reasons trust scientists, their results and recommendations (cf. Fine 1998: 18). Thus, perhaps what is unifying among the difference senses of objectivity is that each sense describes a feature of scientific practice that is able to inspire trust in science.

Building on this idea, Inkeri Koskinen has recently argued that it is in fact not trust but reliance that we are after (Koskinen forthcoming). Trust is something that can be betrayed, but only individuals can betray whereas objectivity pertains to institutions, practices, results, etc. We call scientific institutions, practices, results, etc. objective to the extent that we have reasons to rely on them. The analysis does not stop here, however. There is a distinct view about objectivity that is behind Daston and Galison’s historical epistemology of the concept and has been defended by Ian Hacking: that objectivity is not a—positive—virtue but rather the absence of this or that vice (Hacking 2015: 26). Speaking of objectivity in imaging, for instance, Daston and Galison write that the goal is to

let the specimen appear without that distortion characteristic of the observer’s personal tastes, commitments, or ambitions. (Daston and Galison 2007: 121)

Koskinen picks up this idea of objectivity as absence of vice and argues that it is specifically the aversion of epistemic risks for which the term is reserved. Epistemic risks comprise “any risk of epistemic error that arises anywhere during knowledge practices’ (Biddle and Kukla 2017: 218) such as the risk of having mistaken beliefs, the risk of errors in reasoning and risks related to operationalization, concept formation, and model choice. Koskinen argues that only those epistemic risks that relate to failings of scientists as human beings are relevant to objectivity (Koskinen forthcoming: 13):

For instance, when the results of an experiment are incorrect because of malfunctioning equipment, we do not worry about objectivity—we just say that the results should not be taken into account. [...] So it is only when the epistemic risk is related to our own failings, and is hard to avert, that we start talking about objectivity. Illusions, subjectivity, idiosyncrasies, and collective biases are important epistemic risks arising from our imperfections as epistemic agents.

Koskinen understands her account as a response to Hacking’s (2015) criticism that we should stop talking about objectivity altogether. According to Hacking, “objectivity” is an “elevator” or second-level word, similar to “true” or “real”—“Instead of saying that the cat is on the mat, we move up one story and and say that it is true that the cat is on the mat” (2015: 20). He recommends to stick to ground-level questions and worry about whether specific sources of error have been controlled. (A similar elimination request with respect to the labels “objective” and “subjective” in statistical inference has been advanced by Gelman and Hennig (2017).) In focussing on averting specific epistemic risks, Koskinen’s account does precisely that. Koskinen argues that a unified account of objectivity as averting epistemic risks takes into account Hacking’s negative stance and explains at the same time important features of the concept—for example, why objectivity does not imply certainty and why it varies with context.

The strong point of this account is that none of the threats to a peculiar analysis puts scientific objectivity at risk. We can (and in fact, we do) rely on scientific practices that represent the world from a perspective and where non-epistemic values affect outcomes and decisions. What is left open by Koskinen’s account is the normative question of what a scientist who cares about her experiments and inferences being objective should actually do. That is, the philosophical ideas we have reviewed in this section stay mainly on the descriptive level and do not give an actual guideline for working scientists. Connecting the abstract philosophical analysis to day-to-day work in science remains an open problem.

So is scientific objectivity desirable? Is it attainable? That, as we have seen, depends crucially on how the term is understood. We have looked in detail at four different conceptions of scientific objectivity: faithfulness to facts, value-freedom, freedom from personal biases, and features of community practices. In each case, there are at least some reasons to believe that either science cannot deliver full objectivity in this sense, or that it would not be a good thing to try to do so, or both. Does this mean we should give up the idea of objectivity in science?

We have shown that it is hard to define scientific objectivity in terms of a view from nowhere, value freedom, or freedom from personal bias. It is a lot harder to say anything positive about the matter. Perhaps it is related to a thorough critical attitude concerning claims and findings, as Popper thought. Perhaps it is the fact that many voices are heard, equally respected and subjected to accepted standards, as Longino defends. Perhaps it is something else altogether, or a combination of several factors discussed in this article.

However, one should not (as yet) throw out the baby with the bathwater. Like those who defend a particular explication of scientific objectivity, the critics struggle to explain what makes science objective, trustworthy and special. For instance, our discussion of the value-free ideal (VFI) revealed that alternatives to the VFI are as least as problematic as the VFI itself, and that the VFI may, with all its inadequacies, still be a useful heuristic for fostering scientific integrity and objectivity. Similarly, although entirely “unbiased” scientific procedures may be impossible, there are many mechanisms scientists can adopt for protecting their reasoning against undesirable forms of bias, e.g., choosing an appropriate method of statistical inference, being transparent about different stages of the research process and avoiding certain questionable research practices.

Whatever it is, it should come as no surprise that finding a positive characterization of what makes science objective is hard. If we knew an answer, we would have done no less than solve the problem of induction (because we would know what procedures or forms of organization are responsible for the success of science). Work on this problem is an ongoing project, and so is the quest for understanding scientific objectivity.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Norton, John, manuscript, The Material Theory of Induction , retrieved on 9 January 2020.
• Objectivity , entry by Dwayne H. Mulder in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Bayes’ Theorem | confirmation | feminist philosophy, interventions: epistemology and philosophy of science | feminist philosophy, interventions: philosophy of biology | Feyerabend, Paul | hermeneutics | incommensurability: of scientific theories | Kuhn, Thomas | logic: inductive | physics: experiment in | science: theory and observation in | scientific realism | statistics, philosophy of | underdetermination, of scientific theories | Weber, Max

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What Is A Research (Scientific) Hypothesis? A plain-language explainer + examples

By:  Derek Jansen (MBA)  | Reviewed By: Dr Eunice Rautenbach | June 2020

If you’re new to the world of research, or it’s your first time writing a dissertation or thesis, you’re probably noticing that the words “research hypothesis” and “scientific hypothesis” are used quite a bit, and you’re wondering what they mean in a research context .

“Hypothesis” is one of those words that people use loosely, thinking they understand what it means. However, it has a very specific meaning within academic research. So, it’s important to understand the exact meaning before you start hypothesizing. 

Research Hypothesis 101

• What is a hypothesis ?
• What is a research hypothesis (scientific hypothesis)?
• Requirements for a research hypothesis
• Definition of a research hypothesis
• The null hypothesis

What is a hypothesis?

Let’s start with the general definition of a hypothesis (not a research hypothesis or scientific hypothesis), according to the Cambridge Dictionary:

Hypothesis: an idea or explanation for something that is based on known facts but has not yet been proved.

In other words, it’s a statement that provides an explanation for why or how something works, based on facts (or some reasonable assumptions), but that has not yet been specifically tested . For example, a hypothesis might look something like this:

Hypothesis: sleep impacts academic performance.

This statement predicts that academic performance will be influenced by the amount and/or quality of sleep a student engages in – sounds reasonable, right? It’s based on reasonable assumptions , underpinned by what we currently know about sleep and health (from the existing literature). So, loosely speaking, we could call it a hypothesis, at least by the dictionary definition.

But that’s not good enough…

Unfortunately, that’s not quite sophisticated enough to describe a research hypothesis (also sometimes called a scientific hypothesis), and it wouldn’t be acceptable in a dissertation, thesis or research paper . In the world of academic research, a statement needs a few more criteria to constitute a true research hypothesis .

What is a research hypothesis?

A research hypothesis (also called a scientific hypothesis) is a statement about the expected outcome of a study (for example, a dissertation or thesis). To constitute a quality hypothesis, the statement needs to have three attributes – specificity , clarity and testability .

Let’s take a look at these more closely.

Need a helping hand?

Hypothesis Essential #1: Specificity & Clarity

A good research hypothesis needs to be extremely clear and articulate about both what’ s being assessed (who or what variables are involved ) and the expected outcome (for example, a difference between groups, a relationship between variables, etc.).

Let’s stick with our sleepy students example and look at how this statement could be more specific and clear.

Hypothesis: Students who sleep at least 8 hours per night will, on average, achieve higher grades in standardised tests than students who sleep less than 8 hours a night.

As you can see, the statement is very specific as it identifies the variables involved (sleep hours and test grades), the parties involved (two groups of students), as well as the predicted relationship type (a positive relationship). There’s no ambiguity or uncertainty about who or what is involved in the statement, and the expected outcome is clear.

Contrast that to the original hypothesis we looked at – “Sleep impacts academic performance” – and you can see the difference. “Sleep” and “academic performance” are both comparatively vague , and there’s no indication of what the expected relationship direction is (more sleep or less sleep). As you can see, specificity and clarity are key.

Hypothesis Essential #2: Testability (Provability)

A statement must be testable to qualify as a research hypothesis. In other words, there needs to be a way to prove (or disprove) the statement. If it’s not testable, it’s not a hypothesis – simple as that.

For example, consider the hypothesis we mentioned earlier:

Hypothesis: Students who sleep at least 8 hours per night will, on average, achieve higher grades in standardised tests than students who sleep less than 8 hours a night.  

We could test this statement by undertaking a quantitative study involving two groups of students, one that gets 8 or more hours of sleep per night for a fixed period, and one that gets less. We could then compare the standardised test results for both groups to see if there’s a statistically significant difference. 

Again, if you compare this to the original hypothesis we looked at – “Sleep impacts academic performance” – you can see that it would be quite difficult to test that statement, primarily because it isn’t specific enough. How much sleep? By who? What type of academic performance?

So, remember the mantra – if you can’t test it, it’s not a hypothesis 🙂

Defining A Research Hypothesis

You’re still with us? Great! Let’s recap and pin down a clear definition of a hypothesis.

A research hypothesis (or scientific hypothesis) is a statement about an expected relationship between variables, or explanation of an occurrence, that is clear, specific and testable.

So, when you write up hypotheses for your dissertation or thesis, make sure that they meet all these criteria. If you do, you’ll not only have rock-solid hypotheses but you’ll also ensure a clear focus for your entire research project.

What about the null hypothesis?

You may have also heard the terms null hypothesis , alternative hypothesis, or H-zero thrown around. At a simple level, the null hypothesis is the counter-proposal to the original hypothesis.

For example, if the hypothesis predicts that there is a relationship between two variables (for example, sleep and academic performance), the null hypothesis would predict that there is no relationship between those variables.

At a more technical level, the null hypothesis proposes that no statistical significance exists in a set of given observations and that any differences are due to chance alone.

And there you have it – hypotheses in a nutshell. 

If you have any questions, be sure to leave a comment below and we’ll do our best to help you. If you need hands-on help developing and testing your hypotheses, consider our private coaching service , where we hold your hand through the research journey.

Psst... there’s more!

This post was based on one of our popular Research Bootcamps . If you're working on a research project, you'll definitely want to check this out ...

17 Comments

Very useful information. I benefit more from getting more information in this regard.

Very great insight,educative and informative. Please give meet deep critics on many research data of public international Law like human rights, environment, natural resources, law of the sea etc

In a book I read a distinction is made between null, research, and alternative hypothesis. As far as I understand, alternative and research hypotheses are the same. Can you please elaborate? Best Afshin

This is a self explanatory, easy going site. I will recommend this to my friends and colleagues.

Very good definition. How can I cite your definition in my thesis? Thank you. Is nul hypothesis compulsory in a research?

It’s a counter-proposal to be proven as a rejection

Please what is the difference between alternate hypothesis and research hypothesis?

It is a very good explanation. However, it limits hypotheses to statistically tasteable ideas. What about for qualitative researches or other researches that involve quantitative data that don’t need statistical tests?

In qualitative research, one typically uses propositions, not hypotheses.

could you please elaborate it more

I’ve benefited greatly from these notes, thank you.

This is very helpful

well articulated ideas are presented here, thank you for being reliable sources of information

Excellent. Thanks for being clear and sound about the research methodology and hypothesis (quantitative research)

I have only a simple question regarding the null hypothesis. – Is the null hypothesis (Ho) known as the reversible hypothesis of the alternative hypothesis (H1? – How to test it in academic research?

this is very important note help me much more

Hi” best wishes to you and your very nice blog” 

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